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I. THE MARKET SETTING » ........................................................ .............  1
Io THE MARKET SETTING
1. Primary commodities constitute an overwhelming share of the Latin 
American 1/ exports, as is the case with virtually all developing coun­
tries o Although the share of manufactured goods exports has been rising 
rapidly, in 1970 primary products still accounted for 89 percent of their 
total exports (Chart I). A feature of the 1960's was a sharp contraction 
in the share of agriculture in total exports; the seventies will probably 
reflect a marked rise in the share of petroleum. Conversely, the imports 
have been dominated by manufactures; this is unlikely to change much in 
the 1970's, although there will be a continued expansion in the share of 
petroleum.
2. Latin America is a dominant or an influential suppliers of many 
primary products in world markets, particularly bananas, coffee, cotton, 
meat, sugar, fishmeal, bauxite, copper and silver. In 1970-72, the devel­
oping countries accounted for 29.5 percent of world trade in commodities 
(petroleum excluded); Latin America alone supplied 12.5 percent, nearly 
matching the combined primary exports of developing Asia and Africa 
(Table l). The share of Latin America in world trade of major primary 
products is shown in Chart II.
3. With the exception of Mexico all Latin American countries are 
highly dependent on the exports of two or three primary commodities (Chart 
III). The lack of diversity in their exports combined with other factors 
discussed later, places them in a weak position in exercising a commensur­
ate influence in determination of market prices of these products.
Uo Historically, the commodity trade has been generally characterized
by sluggish growth in demand (as compared to manufactures), wide price 
fluctuations, relatively low price and income elasticities of demand and 
relative inelasticity of supplies in the short to medium run. These 
characteristics coupled with the stricture of the markets, competition 
from substitutes and protectionist policies of the importing countries 
tend to work against the economic interests of the exporting countries.
This reflects the wide concern of the exporting countries about relying on 
commodity exports and disenchantment of the poorer nations with the esta­
blished structure of world trade.
5o Commodity exports of the Latin .American countries expanded at an
annual rate of 6.U percent in 1960-70o Although their manufactured 
exports expanded sharply, rising to 22 percent per year, the total exports 
from the region increased by only 5*7 percent per annum in 1960-70. This 
compared with a 9<>3 percent increase in world trade generally. The 
result has been that the share of the developing countries and even more 
so of Latin America in world trade, has been steadily shrinking (Table 2 ) 0 
Nevertheless, the export performance in recent years cannot be considered 
as unsatisfactory. The declining terms of trade, a marked feature of the 
1950's, was stopped in the 1960's while the volume of Latin American exports 
rose steadily0 The index of terms of trade after reaching a trough in 1962
y  Throughout this paper, the term Latin America includes the Caribbean.
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Table 1: SHARE OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN











Petroleum lOOoO 50.7 10.1 39.2 12.5 17.0 9.6
Excluding
Petroleum 100.0 60.3 10.2 29.5 12.5 9.2 7.8
Source: U0N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues»
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Table 2: SHARE OF VARIOUS REGIONS IN WORLD TRADE











1950 60.9 8.0 31.0 12.3 13.5 5.0
1951 63.1 7.7 29.2 10.7 13.5 U .9
1952 65.U 8.7 25.9 10.1 10.8 U.9
1953 6U.9 9.6 25.5 10.6 9o9 U.8
195U 6U.3 lOoO 25.7 IO06 9.9 5.0
1955 6U.7 10.0 25.3 9.9 10.5 U.7
1956 66.3 9.8 23.9 9.6 9.8 Uo5
1957 67.2 10.0 22.7 9.1 9.U U.l
1958 65.9 11.2 22.9 8.9 9.6 U.3
1959 65.U 12 o3 22.3 8.3 9.6 Uo2
I960 66.9 11.7 21.3 7.8 9.3 U.l
1961 67.5 11.7 20.7 7.6 8.9 U.o
1962 67.2 12.3 20.5 7o5 8.9 3.9
1963 67. U 12.1 20.U 7.3 8.9 U.o
196U 68.2 11.8 20.0 7.0 8.6 U.2
1965 68.8 11.6 19.5 6.8 8.5 U.o
1966 69.5 11.U 19.0 6.6 8.U U.o
1967 69.6 11.6 18.8 6.3 8.U 3.9
1968 70.3 11.3 18. U 5.9 8.3 U.o
1969 71.0 10.9 18.1 5.7 8.2 U.l
1970 71.7 10.7 17.6 5.6 7.9 U.o
1971 72o3 10.U 17.3 U.8 8.7 3o7
1972 72o 3 10.3 17. U U.7 9o 0 3o6
Sources: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics, 1972; UoNo Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 
June 197U»
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remained remarkably stable at around 100 in the next ten years (Table 3). 
Improvement in the relative price of coffee was a contributing factor.
In this respect, price stabilization policies pursued by Brazil perhaps 
need to be commended. However, prices of some other commodities notably 
sugar, bananas, cotton, fishmeal, remained weak during the 1960's. The 
prices of primary commodities in constant dollars tended to decline during 
the 1950's until about 1962¡ since then no major changes occurred until 
the middle of 1972 (Table U)„ More recently, in 1970-7U, while the rate 
of increase in the export prices of manufactured goods has accelerated, the 
rise in commodity prices has been far greater. The terms of trade of pri­
mary products in relation to manufactures rose by approximately U5 percent, 
virtually wiping out losses of the 1950's and I960's . Since Latin American 
exports are basically commodity oriented, it  is useful to examine recent 
developments within their historical global perspective.













ImportsTotal Exclo Pet. Total Excl. Pet» Total Excl. Pet.
1955 112 llU 101 111 113 73 73 86
1956 112 111; 103 109 110 79 79 89
1951 109 111 103 103 103 81 80 102
1956 102 102 102 101 100 82 82 97
1959 97 93 99 98 93 88 89 92
I960 97 96 100 97 96 90 91 96
1961 96 9h 100 93 93 91* 93 99
1962 95 93 103 92 90 99 100 98
1963 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1961; 107 110 101 106 109 101 101 109
1963 IO6 109 lOli 103 103 107 107 107
1966 108 n i 10U 103 107 111 113 117
1967 103 108 106 100 102 11h 116 121
1968 106 109 107 99 102 118 121 131
1969 109 111; 109 100 ion 126 128 H4O
1970 113 121 113 101 IO6 132 139 133
1971 122 123 122 101 103 127 139 160
1972 129 132 126 102 103 137 131 176
Sources; U.N0 Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues.
i
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Table U: COMMODITY PRICE INDEX
(36 commodities)











1970 1971 1972 1973 197U(Jan-
June)
Current
Dollars 119 12 U 100 102 100 105 llli 128 187 U55
Constant
Dollars 136 133 107 105 100 97 99 100 122 260
Source: Commodities & Export Projections Division, Economic Analysis
and Projections Department, World Bank»
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l l .  RECENT MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
60 The lack of buoyancy or the prospects of a boom contributed to a
general slackening in the rate of investment in the commodity sector so 
that by 1970 3upply and demand in many products had moved towards a rela­
tively balanced position» But events took a dramatic turn beginning late 
1972; world production and income grew at an exceptional rate in 1972-73, 
triggering both massive inflation and a bocm in commodity prices» The 
bulk of import demand for primary commodities is in the OECD countries 
(about 71 percent of world impcrts) and the GNP of these countries grew at 
5.8 percent in 1972 and 6.7 percent in 1973, compared with an average of 
U.9 percent in 1960-70. The volume of ŒCD trade grew at almost twice 
the ten year average rate, with imports expanding at 13 percent and exports 
at 15 percent. The volume of world trade also grew at an unprecedented 15 
percent in 1973*
7» The very rapid growth of demand resulting from economic expansion,
declining unemployment and a more rapid increase in real incomes, placed 
serious pressures on supplies, of a number of commodities. The failures 
of food grain crops in many parts of the world and the low Peruvian fish 
catch greatly disturbed the supply-demand balance for food and feed pro­
ducts. The fact that investment in fertilizer capacity had lagged for 
some years meant that supplies of this strategic product also were very 
scarce, threatening a continuance of worldwide foodgrain shortages. This 
difficult situation was further aggravated by the major increases in the 
price of oilo General inflation intensified and expected further price 
and income increases generated stronger demand for primary commodities than 
would otherwise be expected on the basis of commodity market developments 
alone» Furthermore, some movement from liquid assets into commodities may 
also have taken place since the major currencies no longer provided the 
stability and security they had in the past»
8. As a result of these factors, combined with and strengthened by the
fluctuations in major exchange rates, the high rate of inflation exper­
ienced in the industrial countries and some commodity speculation, the 
prices of primary products which had begun to rise in the middle of 1972 
climbed to unprecedented levels in 197U. Prices of commodities other than 
crude oil, on the whole, have doubled since 1972. Although a few commodi­
ties, particularly tea, bananas, citrus fruit, jute and iron ore did not 
benefit from this major price rise, the increases were widespread with 
grains and sugar leading. Timber prices matched the sharp rise in the 
prices of basic foods.
9» Some developing countries, particularly those exporting petroleum,
with their rising purchasing power and growing foreign exchange reserves 
were able to purchase commodities, even at high prices, to meet internal 
consumption requirements. Although their demand was not important in 
total, their marginal impact was probably significant.
lOo The residual nature of trade in some commodities also tends to
amplify the price fluctuations. Slight changes in output may generate 
considerable price variations in international markets» For example, in
*
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1972-73 a J4 percent drop in world cereal production caused prices to treble 
on world markets. This was also the case in the world vegetable oils mar­
ket in 1973-7U, when the normal annual increase of a million tons of produc­
tion did not materialize.
11. Market linkages give rise to chain reactions among prices of some 
commodities. The rising demand for meat exerts a strong pull on feed 
grains. The use of advanced technology in production and feeding has 
increased the demand for cereals and protein meals to enchance weight gain0 
As a consequence of the larger inputs of cereals and protein per pound of 
meat, particularly in the case of beef, the richer part of the world pop­
ulation indirectly now consumes greater quantities of grain and oilseed 
products than before. At this time, too, the decision of the USSR to sus­
tain its livestock numbers by importing grain, rather than increasing the 
slaughter rate as had been the case in previous bad harvests, augmented 
demand pressures.
12o These combined factors markedly raised the demand for feed at a 
time when the supply was cut back. Fishmeal virtually disappeared; demand 
for it shifted to soybean meal, the closest substitute. Other commodities, 
especially West African groundnuts, encountered production difficulties.
The most spectacular grain price rise occurred in wheat and rice. After 
the huge US wheat sale to the USSR, wheat stocks in the major exporting 
countries remained sufficient to meet normal demand. But world rice stocks 
are traditionally small relative to output and whenever import needs of rice 
consuming countries increase due to an impending food shortage, these coun­
tries have tended to meet a large part of their requirements with wheat 
shipments. Unfortunately, in many countries prolonged drought conditions 
in 1972-73 reduced output: import demand thus exceeded "normal" levels.
Stocks of wheat were not adequate for meeting such demand, resulting in 
sharp price increases.
13. The sharp increases in the prices of metals and minerals in 1973 
were mainly due to three factors: (a) a rapid rise in industrial produc­
tion; (b) major bottlenecks in smelting capacity; and (c) increased specu­
lative activities. Elasticities of demand with respect to industrial 
activity are relatively high (usually close to unity) in the case of most 
industrial raw materials including, of course, metals and minerals. The 
10 percent increase in OECD industrial production in 1973 entailed not only 
a parallel rise in the consumption of metals and minerals, but also radical 
increases in desired stock levels at the users1 end.
ill. As a result of markedly tightened pollution control regulations in
major industrial countries, smelting capacity became a bottleneck espec­
ially in zinc and copper.
15. Despite the slowdown in industrial activity since the second half
of 1973, the prices of most non-ferrous metals rose further; spiralling 
inflation and increased uncertainty in exchange rates of major international 
currencies provoked speculative "investments" in commodities„ This affect­
ed gold and silver notably, but also all major non-ferrous metals. In the
- 12 -
case of copper, purchases for stocking by fabricators as hedging against 
possible industry-wide strikes in the United States (the largest producer 
of copper) in the mid-year, further influenced the market.
l6o Although the price boom is unprecedented, a significant part of the
gains can be attributed to the erosion in the value of the dollar. The 
price index in constant dollars of 33 commodities, excluding oil, was only 
10 percent higher in 1973 as compared to the base year (1967-69); in current 
dollar terns it  was 63 percent higher. In 197U, constant dollar prices are 
expected to increase by a further 17 percent, or by 3  ̂ percent in current 
dollars» The price increases in terms of, say, Deutsche Mark, Japan Yen 
and SDR’s, have also been appreciably lower.
17. Ihe principal issues that now face Latin American countries, as
also all non-oil developing countries, are: (i) how are the commodity prices
likely to behave in the future and how will they affect different countries;
(ii) how can the prices of commodities which have not benefitted from the 
boom or collusive producer action, be strengthened; and (iii)  how will the 
non-oil producing countries be able to meet the triple squeeze of sharp 
price rises and difficulty of supplies cf petroleum, foodgrains and fertil­
izers» In order to understand these and related issues, it  is useful to 
first discuss the general economic outlook in the developed countries, the 
main market for products exported by the poorer nations.
- 13 -
III. GENERAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
18. The prices of various primary commodities depend on the growth of 
demand and supply of products and their competiveness, the changes in pro­
tective measures in the markets and the type and degree of market control 
by the major producers. At the same time, prices are also influenced by 
certain general conditions. The general factors that will dominate the 
outlook for primary commodity prices through the rest of this decade are 
the growth in the industrialized countries which remain the main markets 
for primary products, world-wide inflation and the international price of 
crude petroleum.
Economic Growth
19. During 1972 and 1973> the industrialized countries experienced a 
very high rate of economic activity. In fact, the strength of the upswing 
and the coincidence of its timing in practically all OECD countries was 
unprecedented. Industrial production in these countries expanded rapidly 
in the second half of 1972, particularly in the United States, and in 1973 
averaged 10.2 percent above that in 1972 (Table 5).
20. The expansion of world trade measured in current dollars was sub­
stantial. Imports of the OECD countries from the developing countries 
rose by 16.6 percent in 1972 and 1*3 percent in 1973> even excluding petro­
leum. This represents to some extent changes in exchange rates as the value 
increases are measured in terms of US dollars (which were devalued twice in 
December 1973 and February 1973).
21. Although the price boom continued into 1971* (commodity prices, on 
the average, were 11*3 percent higher in January-June 197U as compared to 
1973)> the high levels of utilization of industrial capacity had begun to 
fa ll in most countries by the end of 1973 and the rates of growth are 
expected to be considerably lower in 197U* The projected rates of growth 
are shown in Table 6. The slowdown in 197U is expected to extend itself 
into 1975, followed by a resumption of the long-term growth thereafter.
For the decade of the 1970's, it is likely that the OECD rate of growth 
will equal the average rate in the 1960's of 1*.9 percent per year. However, 
compared to the preceding decade, the geographical pattern of growth changes 
importantly as North America will accelerate it 's  growth and exceed Europe 
for the first time since 1950. The slowdown expected in Japan's growth 
rate is only relative to the high rate in the 1960's , but it  will s till  
exceed the rate observed in the 1950's, as well as those of other OECD 
countries.
Inflation
22. The rapid economic expansion in 1972-73 was accompanied by an 
accelerated rate of inflation. Price and wage increases in the industri­
alized countries not only gained momentum but relationships previously
- 11* -
Table 5: RATES OF GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
AND TRADE OF CECD COUNTRIES 
(in %)
Average
1960/1970 1971 1972 1973
Jan-Mar 
197U
I o  Industrial Production (Volume)
North America £.0 0.1* 7.9 9.2 —Ooi*
Western Europe 5.5 3.0 k.9 8.3 1.7
Japan, Oceania 13.2 3.1 6.1 17.2 2.5
TOTAL OECD Area 5.8 2.0 5.9 10.2 0.8
II. CECD Imports from Developing 
Countries :
Value in US$ 7ol* 11.1 16.6 U3.U
Value in SDR’s 7.1* 11.1 6.5 29.U
Volume 6.0 8.3 12.0 5.2
Sources: OECD, Industrial Production, 1955-1971; Main Economoic Indica­
tors, January and April 1971*; National Accounts of OECD 
Countries, 1960-1971; Overall Trade by Countries, January 197k; 
U.No Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, November 1967 and May 
197k.
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Table 6: GROWTH OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN THE OECD COUNTRIES









1950-60 6.7 U.9 3.1 U.l
1960-70 10o3 b.9 U.l Uo9
1971 6.1 3.1 2.9 3 o5
1972 8o5 U.l 6ol 5o8
1973 10o3 5.9 6.0 6.7
Projections
197U 3.25 1.60 1.55 1.85
1975 5.25 2.15 2.90 3.00
1975-80 7.25 U.00 Lu 6o U.85
1980-85 7.00 ii.80 U .10 I4.080
Sources: OECD, National Accounts of OECD Countries 1960-71 and Main
Economic Indicators, various issues; and International 
Economy Division, Economic Analysis and Projections 
Department, IBRD»
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observed between rates of inflation and levels of unemployment do not appear 
to hold for recent years. The downturn in economic activity since the end 
of 1973 is also being accompanied by a high rate of inflation. Projected 
rates of inflation in the industrialized countries (GNP deflators as well as 
export price indices) are shown in Table 7. It should be noted that these 
rates of change, like the estimates of real growth, are characterized by a 
considerable margin of uncertainty.
23. In this paper, price forecasts are expressed in terms of constant 
197k dollars. In order to obtain the corresponding prices in current dollars, 
these forecasts are inflated in direct proportion to the rate of increase in 
the prices of manufactured goods and equipment exported by the industrial 
country to the developing countries, that is the index of international prices.
21*. The impact of inflation on demand and supply of primary commodities 
is not well understood, particularly when it  is sustained at high rates for an 
extended period. A change in the inflation rates obviously would change the 
commodity forecasts expressed in terms of current dollars, but i t  may also 
alter the underlying production and consumption estimates.
Exchange Rates
2¡?. Exchange rate changes may in themselves have a destabilizing impact 
on commodity prices. Analyses made in the IMF and elsewhere suggest that 
the direot effect of exchange rate changes is relatively small compared 
with the overall movement in prices. However, secondary effects such as 
the uncertainties associated with floating exchange rates, speculation and 
changes in the overall economic outlook induced by exchange rate changes 
could be larger than the direct effects. Estimates tend to be sensitive 
to the prevailing demand, supply and cross-elasticitiesj these are not 
known precisely enough to yield meaningful results. In consequence, the 
price forecasts presented here are shown in terms of US dollars even when 
the projections were made in say pound sterling; historical data in other 
currencies are converted to US dollars using IMF conversion rates. For pro­
jection purposes it  is assumed that the dollar-sterling exchange rate will 
remain the same as its actual rate at the end of 1973 > that is $2.30 to one 
pound. 1/ The underlying assumption is that there will be no change in 
relative exchange rates over the projection period.
Petroleum Prices
260 The stupendous rise in prices of crude petroleum has strong impli­
cations not only for the trade of the developing countries (as well as all 
other countries), but also for individual products depending on the nature 
of their production and marketing. In making the forecasts, these implica­
tions were derived through estimating first the impact on (a) OECD growth 
projections and (b) prices of synthetic substitutes where applicable and 
then the impact of these changes on the demand for primary products and 
hence on the prices of primary products exported by the developing countries.
1 / For many products the price series used are based on the London market 
quotations.
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Table 7: INFLATION INDICES












Source: International Economy Division, Economic Analysis and
Projections Department, World Bank.
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27. Following a series of OFEC actions and negotiations, the realized
price of Saudi Arabian Light Crude (3l*°)f .o.b. Ras Tanura rose markedly 
from $1.90 in 1972 and $2.71 in 1973 to an expected average of $9.60 per 
barrel in 197^. It seems to be the intention of the oil exporting countries 
to hold this price in current dollars in 1975 (decline to $8.65 in terms of 
I97U dollars) and then hold it  firm in constant 1971* dollars that is , see it  
rise in current terms in proportion to the increase in the inflation (inter­
national price) index. This would warrant that the oil exporting countries 
withhold supplies from the market, i f  necessary. On the other hand it is 
equally plausible that given the contraction in demand resulting from high 
prices, the real price of petroleum will tend to decline. These projections, 
together with assumed level of supplies high and low are shown in Table 8.
28. The rise in prices of petrochemical feedstocks following the increase
in crude oil prices, has improved the competitive advantage of some agricul­
tural raw materials, raising the "ceiling price" below which natural products 
can remain competitive with synthetic substitutes. However, the impact of 
higher oil prices will be less where oil is only a small element in the total 
cost of the finished product. The production costs of synthetic rubbers,
acrylic and polyester fibers, which compete with natural rubber, cotton and
wool, are likely to be affected more than those of polypropylene resin and 
products, which compete with jute and hard fibers. The cost of production
of aluminum, copper and steel, which involves substantial energy components, 
will also increase, although probably less than those of synthetic fibers 
and rubbers. 1 /
1 / Energy component in the cost of production is estimated at 18 percent 
in steel, 16.5 in copper and 16 in aluminum.
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Table 8 : ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS FOR PRICES AND OPEC
EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL 
(US$ per barrel)
A. Prlces/1 Posted Price/2 Low High Low High























































Annual Growth 197U-80 (%) +5.7 +2.8
F.O.B. export prices for Saudi Arabian light (3U°) crude o il, f.o .b . 
Ras Tanura. Prices for crude oil exported from all OPEC countries 
are estimated to be on average higher by approximately 60 cents per 
barrel in 197k.
¿2 Posted prices are reference prices, in terms of which taxes and roy­
alties can be computed and export prices and participation buy-back 
prices can be quoted as percentages. They are a devi e adopted to 
obtain pre-determined government unit revenues and export prices and 
their level depends upon the prevailing rules of the day. Hence, 
they are not projected beyond 197k.
The estimate of $9.60 per barrel has been obtained as the sum of 
royalty and taxes of $7.00, $0.11 production cost, $0.35 producers' 
“‘argin and $2.11; government participation benefit on 60% of output. 
The last element could range from $0.90 to $2.25 per barrel depend­
ing whether prices for government crude oil sold to foreign partners 
and third parties were from 73% to 93% of posted price.
Source: Commodities and Export Projections Division, Economic Analysis
and Projections Department, World Bank,
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IV. PROSPECTS
29. Price forecasts for the major commodities can be made under alterna­
tive sets of assumptions concerning the structure of the market, namely:
(a) continuation of present market arrangements, (b) liberalization of access 
to OECD markets, and (0) additional producer action to defend or raise market 
prices. The forecasts presented in this section assume that the present market 
arrangements will continue in vogue, more or less, for the period covered.
Thus, the forecasts aro the product of the general economic factors discussed 
in Section III and the specific factors affecting each of the products presented 
in Annex I . The methodology of forecasting is not discussed here as it  necessar­
ily  varies from product to product.
30. price forecasts for 197l*-80 and 1985 for 36 primary commodities are 
presented in Tables 9 to 12 in tems of current and constant 197Í* dollars.
The associated rates of growth in the volume of exports from the developing 
countries and from Latin America are presented in Table 13. Price indices 
weighted by the value of their exports from the Latin American countries are 
given in Tables 11* and 15.
31o The current price forecasts show that with some initial softening prices
will continue on the average to rise although they do so more slowly in 1975-80 
than in the 1980's when they rise sharply again. Through 1985, largest gains 
are anticipated in timber, non-ferrous metals and basic foods although the prices 
of wheat and rice would tend to soften moderately from their high levels in 1973-71* 
(Chart IV and Table 11*).
32. In constant dollar terms, however, during the latter half of the seventies 
commodity prices will tend to fa ll rather rapidly from their unusually high level 
in I97I* to about the level prevailing in 1967-69 before improving again. With 
the exception of beverages and agriculture non-food, prices of other commodity 
groups in 1980-85 are likely to be higher than in 1967-69, in itself a remunera­
tive period for most commodities exporters. Commodities in a strong market 
position as compared to the decade of the 1960's, will include sugar, livestock 
products, timbers, zinc, bauxite, iron ore; commodities for which constant dollar 
prices will be significantly weaker include tea, fruits and jute which are not 
important in the export trade of Latin America. (Chart V.)
33. The average rate of increase in the volume of exports from all developing 
countries during the seventies is unlikely to be materially different than that 
prevailing in the 1960's. However, some products, notably coffee, bananas, cotton 
and iron ore will grow more slowly in volume terms, whereas others (copper, sugar) 
will grow more rapidly. For Latin America too, the average rate of increase in 
volume of exports will not show too different a behavior than for the developing 
countries as a group but some individual products will tend to show significantly 
different trends largely because of the supply conditions prevailing in Latin 
America. For example, the volume of coffee exports will tend to rise at a faster 
rate as Brazilian supply conditions improve.
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T a b l a  C O M M O D I T Y  P H I C S  F O R E C A S T S  H  C U R R E N T  D O L L A R S
A C T U A L  P R I C E S   P C f t Ë G A S T  P R I C E S
C o m m o d i t y U n i t 1967-69
A V l U A j j
1 9 7 2
n u o w
1 9 7 3
J a n - J u n e
197a 1 9 7 1 * 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 Û 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 .
P e t r o l e u m
F O O D
U S $ / b a r r e l 1.30 I . 9O 2.70 9  . 1 1 1 9 . 6 0 9 . 6 0 1 0 . 3 0 1 1 . 1 0 1 1 . 9 0 1 2 . 8 0 1 3 . 7 5 18 .'
C o c o a i/lb . 36 3 2 6 5 9 2 1 0 0 6 9 7 9 8 3 7 9 8 1 8 3 1 1 0
C o f f e e ¿ / l b . 1 ) 0 5 0 6 2 7 1 7 2 8 3 9 5 9 6 9 6 9 6 1 0 3 1 3 8
T e a ¿ / l b . 5 0 1 * 8 1 * 6 6 3 6 3 6 3 5 7 6 1 6 3 6 5 6 6 8 9
S u g a r  ( W o r l d )
S u g a r  ( U S  P r e f e r e n t i a l )
i/  l b .  







2 1 . 0
1 7 . 8
2 7
2 5
2 0 H i 12 1 3 2 0 2 2 1 8
O r  a n g e a / T a n g e r i n a e Í / 1 0 O  k g . 1 6 . 7 1 5 . 5 I 6 .3 2 0 . 0 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 3 2a 2 6 2 8 3 7
L e m o n a / L i m e o 1 / 1 0 0  k g . H i  . 5 15.2 1 8 . 2 2 0 . 5 2 1 23 2 5 26 28 3 0 3 2 a j
B a n a n a s
L I V E S T O C K  P R O D U C T S
, A g . 12 .7 13.6 i i i . 5 I 7.2 18 2 0 2 0 2 2 23 2 a 2 5 3a
B e e f i/H - 1 5 7 250 3 1 8 3 1 * 5 3 5 0 Í4O O J123 Ü J ; 6 a 9 5 5 5 0 6 0 0 8 9 2
H i d e s  £  S k i n s  
G R A I N S
, / l b . 1 8 . 5 3 1.0 3 9 . 0 b b . o U 5 1 * 7 5 1 5 3 5 9 6 5 7 2 9 6
' W h e a t V k t 6 7 7 1 1 L 7 209 210 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 9 5 1 9 5 1 9 0 1 9 0 2 6 5
R i c e i/m 1 9 8 1 U 7 3 5 0 5 9 2 5 6 o I16O h5o i*i*0 a j o a 2 o a 2 o 5 7 5
M a i z e i/m 5 1 5 6 9 8 121 1 3 5 1 2 5 1 3 0 1 3 3 136 l i i 3 H i  3 1 9 0
G r a i n  S o r g h u m  
F A T S  &  O I L S
i/m U 9 5 6 9 3 107 120 1 2 0 1 2 2 123 1 2 5 1 2 6 1 2 7 17a
C o c o n u t  O i l i/m 3 6 3 2 3 i i 1 * 5 2 1,083 1,100 7 0 2 782 8 0 0 8 2 3 8 1 1 8 7 2 1 , 2 7 6
C o p r a i/m 2 1 3 U l 3 5 3 7 5 3 7 1 0 5 1 6 5 I I 1 5 2 9 5 a o 5 6 3 5 7 a 0 i l 2
G r o u n d n u t  O i l i/m 2 9 5 126 5 b 6 1 , 0 7 7 1,090 7 0 5 7 0 a 7 2 8 7 U 2 7 7 6 7 8 7 1 , 1 1 * 6
G r o u n d  u t f l i/m 1 8 1 , 2 6 1 3 9 3 5 9 6 6 0 0 3 8 i a 3 8 1 3 8 9 3 9 9 a  13 a 2 5 630
P a l m  O i l i/m 1 9 1 2 1 7 3 7 8 6 1 5 6 5 0 1 2 7 1*27 Ui2 a s o a 7 o a 7 7 6 9 5
F i s h m e a l i/m H i S 2 3 9 5 b 2 b i i 9 l i O O 5 7 7 5 6 6 5 6 3 5 8 5 591 601 876
S o y a b e a n  M e a l  
N O N - F O O D
i/m 9 7 1 3 9 302 1 8 3 190 1 5 6 176 2 0 1 238 278 33 a 1 * 8 7
C o t t o n , / l b . 3 0 3 8 6 2 7 6 7 0 6 7 6 6 6 7 7 2 77 8 3 10U
J u t e V I I 2 8 7 3 0 Í Í 2 9 b 3 0 8 3U 0 3 2 7 3 5 8 3 9 0 a 2 o U 5 i a & 5 6 1 7
S i a a l V h t 1 7 0 2 R 0 5 2 7 l , Q b l 1 , 0 6 0 # 5 J i 5 o 5 0 0 375 370 3 9 Û 5 0 0
W o o l , A g . 17I1 2 l i 0 5 1 3 1* 31 » h1 0 Ü 5 5 i i 5 3 ii 1 6 a  13 a a 3 a 7 7 7 a a
R u b b e r , / u > . 2 2 1 8 3 6 b 7 l i O i l l h2 U 5 a s 52 5 6 70
T o b a c c o
T I M B E R
V H T 9 3 1 961 9 9 2 1,030 1 , 0 3 5 1 , 1 5 3 1,250 1 , 3 7 0 1 , 1*93 1 , 6 2 5 1 , 7 6 5 2,370
L o g B  ( L a u a n ) V m 3 l l O l i l 6 8 9 2 9 0 9 1 * 1 0 b 11a 125 1 3 7 1 5 0 213
L o g a  ( N i a n g ó n )  
M E T A L S  A N D  M I N E R A L S
V » 3 3 7 . 2 UQ.l 9 7 . 9 9 1 * 9 0 1 0 0 n o 120 132 1 6 0 223
C o p p e r , / l b . 5 8 1 * 8 81 1 1 7 1 0 0 1 0 5 107 109 1 1 7 1 2 5 1 3 5 200
L e a d , / » > . 1 1 . 5 1 3 . 7 1 9 . 5 29. O 2 7 2 5 2 6 2 6 2 7 2 9 3 2 a 3
T i n i / i i ) . 1 5 5 1 7 7 2 2 7 l i O O J i l O 3 1 7 326 3 3 3 3 a o 3 a 9 3 5 8 532
Z i n c , / l b . 1 2 . l i 1 7 . 1 3 8 . 6 7 1 . 1 6 0 5 0 1 * 7 U 5 a 5 U 9 5 3 7 b
B a u x i t e i/m 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 5 1 9 2 1 2 6 3 0 3 5 a o a 3 a s 6 a
I r o n  O r e i/m 7 . 2 7 . 9 8 . 1 ) 1 0 .0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 3 15 18 21 30
M a n g a n e s e  O r e i/ljTU 6 3 . 2 6I1.5 7 6 . 2 n o . o 1 1 0 1 0 9 1 0 5 109 n o 1 2 6 1 l i 3 1 8 1
S t e e l
F E R T I L I Z E R S
i/m 9 9 1 5 7 2 0 8 2 i i 0 25O 2 6 0 271 2 8 8 300 3 1 1 32a a 3 6
P h o s p h a t e  R o c k i/m 1 2 12 1 1 1 U 6 5 5 b 3 l i 2 a 2 a a a 7 5 0 a s
D A P i/m 6 2 91 1 1 9 2 7 b 3 2 0 2 2 0 1 9 0 1 8 5 1 8 5 190 2 C 5 275
U r e a i/m 6 7 5 9 9 5 2 0 i i 3 2 5 2 1 0 1 9 0 160 l U 5 U i O H i 5 235
M u r i a t e  o f  P o t a s h i/m 2 U 3 b b 3 5 5 5 7 5 0 5 o 5 3 5 6 5 9 6 2 75
N o t e »  S t e r l i n g  p r o j e c t i o n  a s  s u m a d  ü  »  $ 2 . 30 ,
C o m m o d i t i e s  &  E x p o r t  P r o j e c t i o n s  Û L T i s l o n  
E c o n o m i c  A n a l y s i s  &  P r o j e c t i o n s  D e p a r t m e n t  
D e v e l o p ® n t  P o l i c y  S t a f f  
S e p t e m b e r  5 ,  1 5 > 7 i j
T a b l e  1 0 1 D I D  I C E S  O F  C C W M C D I T Y  P H  I C E  F O R E C A S T S  I N  C U R R E N T  D O L L A R S  
1 9 6 7 - 6 9  “  1 00
- 22 -
A C T U A L P R I C E S F O R E C A S T P R I C E S
C o m m o d i t y 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3
J a n - J u n e
1 9 7 6 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5
P e t r o l e u m
F O O D
lh6 2 0 8 7 2 l j 7 3 8 7 3 8 7 9 2 8 5 1 * 9 1 5 . 9 8 5 1 , 0 5 8 1 , 3 8 5
C o c o a  B e a n s 69 1 7 8 2 5 6 278 1 9 0 2 1 7 2 2 8 2 1 7 223 2 2 8 3 0 5
C o f f e e 1 2 6 1 5 7 1 7 8 1 0 2 210 2 1 * 0 2 1 * 2 2 1 * 2 2 1 * 2 26O 3 1 * 8
T e a 9 7 9 7 1 2 6 126 1 2 7 1 1 5 1 2 3 I 27 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 7 9
S u g a r  ( W o r l d )







1 , 1 7 1 *
3 8 5
0 7 0 6 0 9 522 5 6 5 870 9 5 7 7 8 3
O r a n g e s / T a n g e r i n e s 9 3 9 8 1 2 0 128 1 2 2 1 3 0 1 3 8 H * 5 1 5 5 1 6 6 2 2 3
L e m o n s / L i m e s 1 0 5 1 2 6 n a 16I I 6I 1 6 8 1 7 7 190 20I* a 9 2 9 3
B a n a n a s
L I V E S T O C K  P R O D U C T S
1 0 7 l i u 1 3 5 1 1 * 2 1 5 7 1 5 7 1 7 3 1 8 1 1 0 9 197 268
B e e f 1 5 9 2 0 3 2 2 0 2 2 3 2 5 5 2 6 9 2 0 1 * 3 1 5 3 5 0 3 0 2 5 6 8
H i d e s  &  S k i n s  
G R A I N S
168 2 1 1 238 2 1 * 3 2 5 2 2 7 7 2 0 1 * 320 3 5 1 3 0 6 5 1 7
M i  e a t 106 2 1 9 3 1 2 3 1 3 3 1 3 2 9 9 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 0 1 * 2 0 1 * 3 9 6
R i c e 7 6 1 7 7 2 9 9 2 0 3 2 3 2 2 2 ? 2 2 2 a 7 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 9 0
M a i z e 1 1 0 1 9 2 2 3 7 2 6 5 2 1 * 5 2 5 5 261 267 2 8 0 2 8 0 3 8 8
G r a i n  S o r g h u m  
F A T S  &  G I L S
l i l i 1 9 0 218 2 1 * 5 21*5 2 1 * 9 2 5 1 255 2 5 7 2 5 9 3 5 5
C o c o n u t  O i l 6 6 1 2 5 2 9 8 3 0 3 215 2 1 5 2 2 3 227 2 2 3 2 1 * 0 3 5 ;
C o p r a 66 1 6 6 3 5 U 3 3 3 2 1 * 2 2 1 * 1 2 1 * 8 251* 2 6 1 * 2 7 0 3 9 5
G r o u n d n u t  O i l 1 1 * 1 8 5 3 6 5 3 6 9 2 3 9 2 3 9 2 1 * 7 252 2 6 3 2 6 7 3 8 0
G r o u n d n u t s 1 1 * 2 2  H i 3 2 1 * 3 2 6 2 0 9 2 0 7 2 1 1 217 2 2 5 2 3 1 3 U 2
P a l m  O i l i l l * 1 9 0 3 2 2 3 1 * 0 2 2 1 ; 2 2 1 * 2 3 1 236 2 1 * 6 2 5 0 3 6 1 *
F i s h m e a l 1 6 5 3 7 6 3 1 0 276 3 9 0 3 9 0 3 8 0 1 * 0 3 1 * 0 0 1 * 1 5 6 0 6
S o y a b e a n  M e a l  
N O N - F O O D
1 3 3 3 1 1 1 8 9 1 9 6 l 6 l 1 0 1 2 0 7 2 1 * 5 2 0 7 31*1* S O ;
C o t t o n 1 2 7 2 0 7 2 5 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 0 2 2 3 2 1 * 0 2 5 7 2 7 7 3 1 * 7
J u t e 106 1 0 2 1 0 7 n s 1 1 1 * 1 2 5 1 3 6 1 1 * 6 1 5 7 169 2 1 5
S i s a l i l a 3 1 0 612 6 2 1 * 3 3 8 2 6 5 2 3 5 2 2 1 218 2 2 9 2 9 1 *
W o o l 1 3 8 2 9 1 * 2 1 * 9 236 261 260 2 3 9 2 3 7 2 5 ? 2 7 1 * 1*28
R u b b e r 8 2 1 6 1 * 216 1 8 2 1 0 6 1 9 1 2 0 5 2 1 0 236 2 5 5 3 1 8
T o b a o c o
T I M B E R
1 0 3 1 0 7 i n m 1 2 1 * 1 3 I* l l * 7 I 60 1 7 5 1 9 0 2 5 5
L o g s  ( L a u a n ) 1 0 3 1 7 0 230 225 2 3 5 260 2 8 5 3 1 3 3 1 * 3 3 7 5 5 3 3
L o g s  ( N i a n g o n )  
M E T A I S  A N D  M I N E R A I S
1 2 9 2 6 3 253 21*2 269 2 9 6 3 2 3 3 5 5 3 9 0 1 * 3 0 5 9 9
C o p p e r 8 3 l i * 0 202 172 1 0 1 1 0 1 * 1 0 8 2 0 2 a 6 2 3 3 3 1 * 5
L e a d 1 1 9 1 7 0 252 235 2 1 7 2 2 6 2 2 6 2 3 5 252 2 7 8 3 7 1 *
T i n l l l i 1 1 * 250 2 6 5 2 0 5 210 2 1 5 a 9 225 2 3 1 3 6 3
Z i n o 1 3 8 3 H 5 7 3 1 * 81 * 1 * 0 3 3 7 9 3 6 3 3 6 3 3 9 1 1*23 5 9 7
B a u x i t e 1 0 0 1 0 6 1 5 8 1 7 5 2 1 3 2 1 * 8 2 8 8 3 3 3 3 5 8 3 9 8 5 3 2
I r o n  C t r e n o U 7 1 3 9 1 3 9 1 3 8 1 5 7 1 7 8 2 1 0 2 1 * 6 2 8 0 1 * 1 7
M a n g a n e s e  O r e 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 7 1 * 1 7 1 * 1 7 2 166 1 7 2 1 7 1 * 1 9 9 226 2 0 6
S t e e l
F E R T I L I Z E R S
1 5 9 a o 262 2 5 3 2 6 3 2 7 1 * 2 9 1 3 0 3 31U 327 1* 1* 0
P h o s p h a t e  R o o k 1 0 0 1 1 7 3 8 3 1 * 5 8 3 5 8 3 5 0 3 5 0 3 6 ? 3 9 2 1 * 1 7 1 * 0 0
D A P 1 1 * 7 1 9 2 6 6 2 5 1 6 3 5 5 3 0 6 298 2 9 8 306 3 3 1 1*1*1*
U r e a 8 0 1 1 * 2 l*2l* 1 * 8 5 3 1 3 2 0 1 * 2 3 9 2 1 6 2 0 9 216 351
M u r i a t e  o f  P o t a s h 1 1 * 2 1 7 9 2 2 9 238 2 0 0 208 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 1 * 6 3 5 8 3 1 3
N o t e i  S t e r l i n g  p r o j e c t i o n s  a s s u m e  L I  -  $ 2 . 3 0
C o m m o d i t i e s  & Export P r o j e o t i o n s  D i v i s i o n  
E c o n o m i c  A n a l y s i s  &  P r o j e c t i o n s  D e p a r t m e n t  
D e v e l o p m e n t  P o l i c y  S t a f f
S e p t e m b e r  5 ,  1 9 7 6
Table Ui COMMODITY PRICE FORECASTS IN 197b COiETAMT DOLLARS
A C T U A L P R I C E S F O R E C A S T R U C E S
C o r a n o c ü t y U n i t 1967-69 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3
J e n - J u n e
1 9 7 2 * 1 9 7 b 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5
P e t r o l e u m
F O O D
U S $ / b a r r e l 2 . 2 8 2 . 6 1 3 . O 8 9 - 1 * 1 9 . 6O 6 . 6 5 8 . 6 5 0 . 6 5 8 . 6 5 8 . 6 5 8 . 6 5 0 . 6 5
C o c o a t n b . 6 b U i 7 U 9 2 1 0 0 62 6 6 6 5 5 ? 5 5 5 2 5 2
C o f f e e i / l b . 6 9 6 9 7 1 7 1 7 2 7 5 8 0 7 2 7 0 6 5 6 5 6 5
T e e ¿ / i h. 8 7 6 6 5 5 63 6 3 5 7 b 8 b 8 b 6 b b b 2 i | 2
S u g a r  ( W o r l d )
S u g a r  ( U S  P r e f e r e n t i a l )
¿ / l b .  
¿ / l b .
Í 4 . 1
l l . U
1 0 . 0
u . o
1 0 . 8
1 0 . 1
2 1 . 0
1 7 . 8
2 7
2 5
1 8 1 2 9 9 l b U l 9
O r a n g e s / T a n g e r i n e s y i o o  k g . 2 9 . 2 2 1 . 3 1 8 . 6 2 0 . 0 2 1 18 18 1 8 1 8 18 18 1 8
L e m o n s / L i m e s $ / i o o  k g . 2 5 . b 2 0 . 9 2 0 . 8 20.5 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0
B a n a n a s
L I V E S T O C K  P R O D U C T S
¿ A g . 2 2 . 2 1 8 . 7 1 6 . 5 1 7 , 2 18 18 1 7 1 7 1 7 l u 1 6 1 6
B e e f t n  g . 2 7 b 3 i i 3 3 6 3 3 b 5 350 3 6 1 3 5 b 3 5 0 3 5 9 3 6 S 3 7 7 U L 9
H i d e s  &  S k i n s  
G R A I N S
t/l b . 3 2 . h b 2 . 6 U i . 5 U i . o b 5 b 2 b 3 b l L 3  • U l b 5 b 5
W b e a t %/m 1 1 7 9 8 1 6 8 2 0 9 2 1 0 1 8 9 1 6 8 1 5 2 l b  2 129 1 2 0 1 2 5
R i c e %/m 3 b 7 2 0 2 3 9 9 5 9 2 560 b l 5 3 7 8 3 U i 3 1 3 2a , 2 6 5 2 7 0
M a i z e %/m 8 9 7 7 1 1 2 1 2 1 135 1 1 3 1 0 9 1 0 b 9 9 9 5 9 0 9 3
G r a i n  S o r g h u m  
F A T S  it O I L S
%/m 8 6 7 7 1 0 6 1 0 7 1 2 0 108 1 0 2 9 6 9 1 0 5 8 0 8 2
C o c o n u t  O i l V i f f 6 1 5 3 5 0 6 2 9 1 , 0 8 3 1 , 1 0 0 7 0 5 6 5 6 631 5 9 8 5 8 2 5 b 9 6 0 0
C o p r a %/m 3 7 2 1 9 b i i 0 3 7 5 3 7 1 0 b 6 5 b 3 2 b i b 3 9 3 381 3 6 1 3 9 6
G r c w n d n u t  O i l %/m 5 1 6 5 9 5 6 2 3 1 , 0 7 7 1 , 0 9 0 636 5 9 1 5 6 9 5 3 9 5 2 5 b 9 5 5 b 0
G r o u n d n u t s %/m 322 3 7 2 U i 8 5 9 6 6 0 0 3 b 6 320 3 0 b 2 9 0 2 7 9 2 6 7 2 9 6
P a l m  O i l %/m 3 3 6 3 0 6 i i 3 1 6 1 5 6 5 0 3 8 5 3 5 8 3 b 5 327 3 1 8 3 0 0 3 2 7
F i s h m e a l %/m 2 5 b 3 2 8 6 1 8 U * 9 b o o 520 b 7 5 U i O b 2 5 b o o 3 7 8 b l 2
S o y a b e a n  H e a l  
N O N - F O O D
%/m 2 0 6 2 0 2 3 U i 183 190 l i i l D * 8 1 5 7 1 7 3 1 8 8 2 1 0 2 2 9
C o t t o n ¿ / l b . 5 3 52 7 1 7 6 7 0 60 5 5 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2
J u t e V L T 5 0 3 m s 3 3 5 3 0 8 3 b 0 2 9 5 3 0 0 305 3 0 5 3 0 5 305 2 9 0
S i s a l $ / H T 2 9 8 330 6 0 7 1 , 0 2 * 1 1 , 0 6 0 5 1 8 3 7 8 313 2 7 3 250 2 b 5 2 3 5
W o o l t n g . 3 0 i 330 5 8 6 b 3 b b i o b l O 380 3 2 5 3O Q 3 0 0 300 3 5 0
R u b b e r t/ l b . 3 8 25 U l U 7 b O 3 7 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 3
T o b a c c o
T I M B E R
%/m 1 , 6 3 0 1,320 1 , 1 3 1 1,030 1 , 0 3 5 1 , 0 1 * 0 1,050 1 , 0 7 0 1 , 0 8 5 1 , 1 0 0 1 , 1 1 0 1 , 1 1 5
L o g s  ( L a u a n ) V m 3 7 0 5 6 7 8 9 2 90 8 5 8 ? 8 9 9 1 9 3 9 5 1 0 0
L o g s  ( N i a n g o n )  
M E T A L S  à  M I N E R A L S
V m 3 6 5 6 6 1 1 1 9 b 9 0 9 0 9 2 9 b 9 6 9 8 1 0 0 105
C o p p e r t n b . 1 0 1 6 7 92 1 1 7 1 0 0 9 5 9 0 8 5 8 5 Q i ­ 8 5 9 b
L e a d t/ l b . 2 0 , 1 1 8 . 8 2 2 . 2 29 . O 2 7 23 2 2 2 0 2 0 a n 2 0 2 0
T i n ¿ / l b . 2 7 1 2 D 3 2 5 9 b O Q b l O 2 8 6 2 7 2 2 6 0 2 b 7 236 2 2 5 25O
Z i n c ¿ / l b . 2 1 . 9 2 3 . 5 U i . o 7 1 . 1 60 b 5 3 9 3 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5
B a u x i t e %/m 2 1 . 1 1 6 . 5 l b . 3 1 9 2 1 2 3 2 5 2 7 2 9 2 9 3 0 30
I r o n  O r e %/m 1 2 . 9 1 0 . 9 9 . 6 1 0 , 0 1 0 9 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 l b
f f e n g a ñ e s e  O r e t/LTU 1 1 0 . 7 8 8 . 6 0 6 . 9 1 1 0 . 0 1 1 0 9 8 8 8 8 5 8 0 8 5 9 0 8 5
S t e e l
F E R T I L I Z E R S
%/m 1 7 3 2 1 6 237 2 b 0 25O 2 3 b 2 2 7 2 2 5 218 2 1 0 2 0 b 2 C 5
P h o s p h a t e  R o c k %/m 2 0 . 0 16. O I 6 .0 b 6 5 5 3 9 3 5 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 23
D A P %/m 1 1 0 1 2 5 136 2 7 b 3 2 0 1 9 8 1 5 9 l b b 1 3 b 1 2 8 1 2 9 129
U r e a %/m 1 1 ? 8 1 108 2 8 b 3 2 5 1 8 9 3 5 9 1 2 5 1 0 5 9 5 9 1 i l l
M u r i a t e  o f  P o t a s h $/m i l 2 . 0 i i ó . O 2 * 9 - 0 5 5 5 7 b 5 b 2 b l b l b o 3 9 3 5
C o m m o d i t i e s  &  E x p o r t  P r o j e c t i o n s  D i v i s i o n  
E c o n o m i c  A n a l y s i s  à  P r o j e c t i o n s  D e p a r t m e n t
D e v e l o p m e n t  P o l i c y  S t a f f  
S e p t e m b e r  5 ,  1 9 7 b
T a b l e  1 2 *  I N D I C E S  O P  C O M M O D I T Y  P R I C E  F O R E C A S T S  I N  197k C  © E T A N T  D O L L A R S  
1 9 6 7 - 6 9  -  1 0 0
- 21* -
A C T U A L P R I C E S F O R E C A S T  P R I C E S
C o m m o d i t y 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3
J a n - J u n e
1 9 7 1 * 1 9 7 1 * 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1980 1 9 8 5
P e t r o l e u m
P O O D
n a 1 3 5 1 * 1 3 1*21 3 7 9 3 7 9 3 7 9 3 7 9 3 7 9 3 7 9 3 7 9
C o c o a 7 0 1 1 6 11*1* 1 5 6 9 8 10l* 102 9 0 86 8 2 8 2
C o f f e e 99 102 1 0 3 101* 108 1 1 5 101* 101 9 1 * 9k 9 1 *
T e a 7 6 6 3 7 2 7 2 66 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 1 1*8 1*8
S u g a r  ( W o r l d )









1 * 3 9 2 9 3 220 220 3 1 * 1 3 l a 220
O r a n g e s / T a n g e r i n e s 7 3 6 1 * 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 2 62 60 60 60 6 0
L e m o n s / L i m e s 8 2 02 81 81 8 3 81 7 9 7 9 7 9 7 9 7 9
B a n a n a s
L I V E S T O C K  P R O D U C T S
8 1 * 7k 7 7 81 81 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 2 7 2
B e e f 1 2 6 1 3 U 1 2 6 1 2 8 1 3 3 1 3 0 1 2 9 1 3 2 1 3 5 1 3 9 1 5 1 *
H i d e s  &  S k i n s  
G R A I N S
1 3 1 1 3 7 1 3 6 1 3 9 1 3 0 1 3 3 127 1 3 3 1 3 6 1 3 9 1 3 9
W h e a t 8 1 * 1 1 * 1 * 1 7 9 1 7 9 1 6 2 1 1 * 1 * 1 3 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 0 7
R i c e 5 8 1 1 5 1 7 1 l 6 l 1 2 0 1 0 9 9 9 9 0 8 2 7 6 7 8
M a i z e 106 126 1 3 6 1 5 2 1 2 7 1 2 2 1 1 7 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 0 1 10 I*
G r a i n  S o r g h u m  
p a t s  &  O I L S
108 1 2 3 1 2 1 * 1 1 * 0 126 1 1 9 1 1 2 106 9 9 9 3 9 5
C o c o n u t  O i l 5 7 8 1 * 1 7 6 1 7 9 1 1 5 1 0 7
0H
9 7 9 5 8 9 9 8
C o p r a 5 2 108 2 0 2 1 9 1 1 2 5 116 1 1 1 106 102 9 7 1 0 7
G r o u n d n u t  O i l 1 1 5 1 2 1 2 0 9 2 1 1 1 2 3 115 n o 1 0 1 * 1 0 2 9 6 1 0 1 *
G r o u n d n u t s 116 1 3 9 1 8 5 186 1 C 0 9 9 9k 9 0 8 7 8 3 92
P a l m  O i l 9 1 1 2 0 1 8 3 1 9 3 1 1 5 1 0 7 1 0 3 9 7 9 5 0 9 9 7
F i s h m e a l 1 2 9 2 1 * 3 1 7 7 1 5 7 2 0 5 1 8 7 1 7 3 1 6 7 1 5 7 1 1 * 9 1 6 2
S o y a b e a n  M e a l  
N O N - F O O D
9 8 1 6 7 8 9 9 2 6 8 7 2 7 6 8 1 * 9 1 1 0 2 1 1 1
C o t t o n 9 8 1 3 1 * 1 1 * 3 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 2 3 9 8 9 8 9 8 9 0 9 8
J u t e 8 3 6 7 6 1 6 0 5 9 60 61 6 l 6 1 61 5 8
S i s a l 1 1 1 2 0 1 * 3 1 * 9 3 5 6 1 7 U 1 2 7 105 9 2 8 1 * 0 2 7 9
W o o l 1 0 9 1 9 3 1 1 * 3 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 2 5 107 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1 5
R u b b e r 6 6 1 0 0 1 2 1 * 1 0 5 9 7 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 8 7
T o b a c c o
T I M B E R
0 1 6 9 6 3 6 1 * 6 1 * 6 1 * 6 6 6 7 6 7 6 8 6 8
L o g s  ( L a u a n ) 80 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 9 1 2 1 1 2 1 * 1 2 7 1 3 0 1 3 3 136 1 1 * 3
L o g s  ( N i a n g o n )  
M E T A I S  &  M I N E R A I S
1 0 2 1 7 1 1 1 * 5 138 1 3 8 1 1 * 2 1 1 * 3 1 1 * 5 l 5 i 15 I* 162
C o p p e r 6 6 9 1 116 9 9 9 1 * 8 9 8 1 * 8 1 * 8 1 * 8 1 * 9 3
L e a d 9k 1 1 0 1 1 * 1 * 1 3 1 * 1 1 2 108 1 0 1 9 8 9 8 1 0 0 1 0 1
T i n 9 0 9 6 1 1 * 8 1 5 1 106 1 0 0 9 6 9 1 6 7 8 3 9 2
Z i n c 1 0 7 2 0 1 3 2 5 2 7 1 * 2 0 5 I 80 160 1 1 * 9 1 5 0 1 5 1 1 5 9
B a u x i t e 7 8 6 8 9 0 1 0 0 1 0 9 1 1 9 1 2 0 1 3 7 1 3 7 11*2 1 1 * 2
I r o n  O r e 8 5 7 5 7 8 7 8 7 9 7 U 7 8 8 6 9 1 * 102 1 0 9
M a n g a n e s e  O r e 80 7 9 9 9 9 9 8 9 7 9 7 7 7 2 7 7 81 7 7
S t e e l
F E R T I L I Z E R S
1 2 5 1 3 7 1 3 9 U * 5 1 3 5 1 3 1 1 3 0 126 1 2 1 118 n 9
P h o s p h a t e  R o c k 80 0 0 2 3 0 2 7 5 1 9 1 * I 76 16I* 160 1 5 9 1 5 8 113
D A P i m 1 2 1 * 2 1 * 9 2 9 1 180 1 1 * 5 1 3 1 1 2 2 116 1 1 7 n 7
U r e a 6 9 9 2 2 1 * 3 2 7 8 162 136 1 0 7 9 0 0 1 7 8 9 5
M u r i a t e  o f  P o t a s h 1 1 0 1 1 7 1 3 1 1 3 6 1 0 7 100 9 9 9 7 9 5 9 3 8 1 *
C o m m o d i t i e s  i c  E x p o r t  P r o j e c t i o n s  D i v i s i o n  
E c o n o m i c  A n a l y s i s  &  P r o j e c t i o n s  D e p a r t m e n t  
D e v e l o p m e n t  P o l i c y  S t a f f  
S e p t e m b e r  5 >  1 9 7 Ü
Table 13.: ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF THE VOLUME OF EXTORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LATIN AMERIC/.(percent per annum)
1955/70 1960/70 1967-Ó9/72-7U 1972-71/1980Developing Latin Countries America Developing: Latin Countries America Developing Latin Countries America Developing Latin Countries America
Petroleum (crude & products)
FOCD
9.7 3.2 10.2 2.3 9.5 u.2 2.6-5.2 -3.U
Cocoa Beans 3.5 0.2 1.1 -0.2 2.1 3.3 2.U 3.5
Coffee 3.0 1.6 2.U o.U 1.3 0.7 1.9 l.U
Tea 1.8 31.0 1.6 19.9 2.9 8.5 2.9 8.5
Sugar, Raw lJ* 3.0 0.8 1.8 3.2 U.6 1.5 2.0
Bananas U.7 U.S U.6 3.6 3.U 3.0 2.6 2.5
Oranges & Tangerines 5.7 U.9 U.7 -0.3 5.7 0 3.7 0
Lemons & Limes 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS
6.U U.l* 5.8 - 7.0 0 5.5 0
Beef U.9 8.6 U.6 6.8 10.0 10.1 3.6 U.U
Hides & Skins 
GRAINS
2.2 7.0 2.6 8.2 -1.0 -U.l 0.0 1.2
Wheat -0.2 -3.3 2.5 -2.8 1.7 0.6 1.9 7.U
Rice -1.7 6.S -U.l n.U 2.9 -0.5 3.2 1.6
Maize & Sorghum 
FATS & OILS
12.8 19.0 9.9 9.5 -1.1 -3.U u.u 1U.3
Copra & Coconut Oil -0.1 -3.2 -0.9 -U.9 -3.3 16.8 0.6 U.8
Groundnuts & Oil 0.7 iS.5 0.8 5.U -7.0 lU.6 0.5 -2.8
Palm Oil 1.3 8.9 2.3 7.7 3.3 10.8 5.3 9.5
Palm Kernels & Oil -1.9 10.9 -2.6 21.0 8.7 -13.6 9.5 7.U
Fishmeal
NON-FOOD
21.9 32.5 11.3 1U.0 -21.0 -16.8 20.0 12.2
Cotton 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.8 0.5 -1.5 1.5 U.9
Jute -2.6 7.2 -2.2 1.7 -3.7 9.2 -3.3 -8.2
Sisal 0.8 2.2 -0.6 U.O 0 l.U 0 -5.0
Wool -1.0 -0.2 -l.U -0.9 -l.U -l.U -1.0 -1.0
Rubber 2.U 32.5 U.o 8.5 U.2 5.2 U.5 5.2
Tobacco
TIMBER
U.3 U.6 2.6 U.7 2.5 7.U 3.5 0
Logs (Broadleaved) 12.9 -0.5 12.5 1.3 6.9 1.1 3.3 0.5
Sawnwood (Broadleaved) 
METALS & MINERALS
6.9 5.3 6.9 13.2 9.5 7.5 10.U 0.6
Copper 3.6 3.8 2.1 2.8 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.9
Lead -1.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Tin 0.8 0.9 2.6 3.5 1.1 1.7 0.2 o.U
Zinc 0.5 2.U 0.8 3.7 3.0 2.3 U.7 3.1
Bauxite 5.U 5.U 5.0 5.0 2.9 2.9 7.U 7.U
Iron Ore 9.5 10.6 8.6 6.3 8.6 8.U 5.5 6.5
Manganese Ore 2.6 8.5 3.1 U.O 0.8 3.U 3.1 3.5
Sourcei Commodities & Export Projections Division Economie Analysis & Projections Department Development Policy Staff
Table ll+: CURRENT DOLLAR COMMODITY PRICE INDEX*
(1970-1972 =» 100)















I960 82 77 78 76 85 71 89 73
1961 80 73 71+ 73 77 70 86 71
1962 78 71+ 76 73 73 7I+ 91 70
1963 81+ 83 87 86 73 93 93 71
1961+ 86 90 90 89 95 86 96 89
1965 85 88 81+ 81+ 90 80 88 101
1966 87 91 81+ 82 86 81 91+ 113
1967 83 81+ 81 79 81 78 91 95
1968 83 86 82 80 82 79 91 98
1969 86 89 86 86 86 86 87 100
1970 92 99 96 97 106 92 89 108
1971 98 95 95 95 92 97 96 95
1972 109 106 109 108 102 111 115 97
1973 155 150 152 11+7 131 156 190 iia
1971+ 3Í+6 218 228 231 158 212 206 188
1975 31+1 209 216 218 172 21+1+ 199 188
1976 350 202 201+ 201+ 197 209 198 195
1977 367 201 200 200 200 200 198 207
1978 391 212 208 208 199 213 209 225
1979 1+29 2 la 239 21+2 199 265 225 21+7
1980 1+62 . 261 257 259 213 285 2I+3 273
1985 597 330 311 309 285 322 321+ 392
•«Weighted by 1970-72 Export Values of L «tin America.
Source: Commodities and Export Projections Division, IBRD.
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I960 10k 98 99 97 108 90 113 93
1961 101 92 93 92 97 88 108 89
1962 97 92 95 91 91 92 113 87
1963 10k 102 107 106 90 115 115 88
196k 105 110 110 108 116 io5 117 108
1965 103 106 101 101 109 97 106 122
1966 103 108 100 97 102 96 112 13k
1967 98 99 95 93 95 92 107 112
1968 99 103 98 95 98 9k 108 317
1969 99 103 99 99 99 99 100 315
1970 99 107 10k io5 115 99 96 117
1971 99 96 96 96 93 98 97 96
1972 100 98 100 99 9k 102 106 89
1973 118 115 116 112 100 119 lk5 108
197k 232 lk6 153 155 106 182 138 126
1975 206 126 131 132 10k lk7 120 Ilk
1976 197 Ilk 115 115 111 117 111 110
1977 192 105 105 105 io 5 Ilk 10k 108
1978 190 103 101 101 97 10k 102 110
1979 19k 109 108 110 90 120 102 112
1980 195 110 108 109 90 120 102 115
1985 188 10k 98 97 90 101 102 12k
#■ Deflated by the Index of International Prices0
Source: Commodities and Export Projections Division, IBRDo
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3Ü. Since the growth in volume of exports is expected to average barely
2.3 percent per annum, the exporting countries would have to depend largely 
on price changes, which are expected to rise by about 7 percent per annum 
(current dollars) in 1972-80. The growth in value of exports of primary 
commodities is expected to average about 10 percent per year.
Qualifications of the Forecasts
3!?. As pointed out earlier, the forecasts presented in this paper should
be read with caution, particularly in the present market situation. They 
depend on a number of assumptions which widen the margin of uncertainty.
36. First, the effect of increased transport costs on the formation of 
commodity prices may not have been fully reflected in the forecasts. The 
cost of moving commodities at various stages of the processing and distribu­
tion process is expected to continue to increase as prices of transportation 
equipment, fuel oil and wages rise further due to inflation. Ocean freight 
rates have already risen sharply; for example, the index of UK Time Charter 
Freight rates trebled between 1972 and early 197U. The cost of transporting 
grain or soybeans from US Gulf ports to continental North-Western Europe rose 
from $8 per ton in 1972 to $30 in October-December 1973; in January-February 
I 97U, the cost of shipping a ton of wheat to India was $1*1* (Table 11*). Domes­
tic transportation costs in various countries have also risen, although the 
extent of the rise and its comparative effect on different commodities is not 
fully known yet.
37. Second, it is assumed that the possibilities of effective producers' 
alliances that benefit the developing countries are limited. Yet there are 
several food and non-food commodities whose prices could be pushed above the 
levels forecast. Products which face competition from synthetic substitutes 
or from primary production in the developed countries are the least suitable 
for such arrangements. Generally, chances for effective producers' action
are limited where the number of producers involved in their production is large 
so that each has a small market share, or where the market is characterized by 
low price and income elasticities and cross-elasticities are high.
38. Many of the non-fuel minerals do not lend themselves to such carteli­
zation by the developing countries because they do not control a sufficiently 
large proportion of either production or reserves. Of the four major non-fuel 
minerals (iron, copper, bauxite and tin) only in the case of tin do developing 
countries dominate known world reserves; their share of world bauxite reserves 
is somewhat over half, of copper less than half and of iron ore, less than a 
third. Furthermore, actual or potential substitutes are available for a major­
ity of minerals - and for some, large supplies of reuseable scrap is available 
in developed countries. These factors merely illustrate the point that import 
demand for most non-fuel minerals in developed countries is price inelastic 
only in the short run.
39. Tin and bauxite - the only two non-fuel minerals for which the distri­
bution of world reserves favors developing countries - are the most suitable 
candidates for cartelization. Tin, however, is quite vulnerable to substitutes 
aluminum, stainless steel and plastics —  and the US stockpile of tin is large.
I
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The case for bauxite rests on the following considerations: (a) the long-terai
demand prospects for this mineral are very favorable; (b) aluminum, the final 
product, has so far faced less competition from substitutes than have other 
metals, and (c) the vertical integration and foreign domination of the industry 
provides both developed and developing producers with a strong incentive for 
group action. But even in this case, it  is only with the participation of 
Australia that producing countries could control the decisive portion (90 per­
cent) of world reserves. Aluminum, moreover, can be produced from alternative 
materials and its supply can be significantly increased by recycling.
1*0. Even in those cases where developing countries cannot maintain higher 
prices in the long run because of less than complete control over supplies, 
the short-run benefits of managed prices could be substantial. These benefits 
must be weighed against possible adverse effects in the medium and long term, 
including irreversible investments in substitutes.
1*1. Third, demand may have been underestimated, since this paper assumes 
no substantial liberalization of the import policies in developed and centrally 
planned countries. Benefits from liberalization of imports by the developed 
countries are pointed out elsewhere. 1 / Yet the centrally planned countries, 
as a result of rising incomes, may well be faced with the need to increase 
both the quantity and variety of imported goods. More liberal import policies 
of the developed and centrally planned economies — through reduction and 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and through the dismantling of pro­
tective systems that surround the agricultural sectors of most industrial 
countries — would be reflected in more rapid growth of demand for the primary 
products examined here. Depending on the supply response, the developing 
countries might also then be able to raise prices above the levels projected 
here.
1*2. A fourth critical assumption relates to fertilizer supply prospects.
The shortages and high prices of fertilizers have already set back agricul­
tural production in some countries. If supplies were not to expand as projected 
here, the world food situation is likely to remain precarious. Food consump­
tion in poor countries is predominantly grains. Inadequate supply of cereals 
and rising prices could have serious social and political consequences. When 
the food situation is tight, the economic burden falls most heavily on those 
countries which are already most vulnerable and most in need of considerable 
external assistance. Their failure — for lack of essential inputs — to 
increase food output would aggravate the distribution problem concerning the 
world's food supplies. On the other hand, several developed countries are, at 
least for some years to come, in a position to increase food production signi­
ficantly. For example, the United States has clearly demonstrated in 1973/7U 
that given its flexible policy framework combined with necessary inputs, it  is 
possible to increase greatly the supply of many agricultural commodities. This 
contrasts with the situation of many developing countries in which the potential 
even of a flexible policy is sharply reduced when basic inputs are scarce.




C hart IVCURRENT DOLLAR COMMODITY PRICE INDEX FOR LATIN AMERICA*
( 1 9 7 0 - 7 2 =  100 )
‘Weighted by 1970 — 1972 Export Values of Latin America

DEFLATED COMMODITY PRICE INDEX FOR LATIN AMERICA* Chart V
(1970-72=100)
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AgricultureNon-Food Agriculture
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V. SCHE THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE FUTURE
U3. Sluggish growth in the volume of exports and a lack of sustainable 
or long-term improvement in the real prices of non-petroleum products, 
point to the unflinching need of substantially increasing the export earn­
ings of the non-oil producing developing countries to help stimulate the 
rate of expansion in their economies. Over the years, the nature of the 
commodity problem has been analyzed by several experts and a range of solu­
tions, both dogmatic and realistic, have been proposed to help alleviate the 
problem. Apart from the series of UN and UNCTAD documents on the subject, 
the issue was discussed by the Pearson Commission 1/ within the context of 
Trade Policy for Development. The problem was further pursued by the 
World Bank in deference to the recommendation made by the Commission. The 
problem still remains a paramount issue with the international community.
UU. It appears from the forecasts presented in this paper that the com­
modity problem and need for solving it has an element of permanency. A 
few thoughts on current proposals are presented here for discussion purposes; 
stale proposals such as price stabilization and non-starters such as deli­
berate policy actions by the developed countries to contract their primary 
products production are left out. The problem needs to be tackled through 
dual efforts-actions, that should be taken by the developing countries and 
measures by the developed countries that would be helpful.
What Can Developed Countries Offer
U5o Several proposals have been advanced at the United Nations and other 
fora which call for deliberate measures by the developed countries to deal 
with the problems of poor countries dependent on primary product exports. 
These include compensation for shortfalls of export receipts, limitation or 
taxation of synthetic substitutes, multi-lateral contracts, commodity agree­
ments, guaranteed prices (indexation) and trade liberalization. Under pre­
sent and difficult world economic conditions, none of these proposals 
appear to stand a chance of success. The last two, which are presently 
receiving greater attention are discussed below:
U6. (a) Indexation. Over the past two decades, the demand of the
developing countries for an equitable and just price for their export pro­
ducts has moved through many phases. Lately, they are demanding an auto­
matic linking of the prices of commodities exported by them with price 
indexes of products inported by them. In other words, they are demanding 
that the real price of their export products be guaranteed for an indefinite 
period of time.
U7. Indexation, of course, has to have a point of reference, a base 
period,2/ against which the parity of the import and export prices can be
y  "Partners in Development", Report of the Commission in International 
Development, 1969.
2/ As also, the composition of each index.

- 31 -
measured. If the suitable base period chosen happens to be the base 
period used in this paper (1967-69 average), then the forecast prices 
imply that although the terms of trade will decline from a level now fav­
orable to the developing countries, the index will drop closer to 100 for 
both developed and developing countries. Although some commodities would 
gain relatively and others lose, there will be no deterioration in terms of 
trade compared to the base year. Consequently, indexation will not result 
in meaningful gains, provided, of course, the forecasts are not too high. 
(Most experts feel that they are, in fact, conservative.) If, on the 
other hand, the developing countries would wish to see, say, 1972-7U as the 
base year, then they are asking for a real, permanent improvement in their 
terms of trade. Maintaining prices at a permanent, real, higher level 
will inevitably pose unsuimountable problems of implementation»
U8. To implement the scheme, it would have to be managed globally and 
the developed countries would need to ’nationalize* or ’regulate' their 
import trade. This does not appear to be feasible at least for some years 
to come. A high guaranteed price for a commodity also implies the need 
to regulate production and institute export controls. If this leads to 
perpetuation of established patterns of production, diversification may be 
seriously impaired and the efficiency of resource use may be compromised. 
Moreover, i f  production controls are feasible, the developing countries do 
not need to ask the developed countries for indexation.
i¿9* (b) Trade Liberalization. The difficulties concerning access to
the markets of the developed countries for agricultural products of the 
developing countries are widely known. If the developed (OECD) countries 
were to completely liberalize their imports, the developing countries would 
be able to add some $8 billion to their export earnings by 1980 fran the 
commodities under reference (Table 16). The estimate is based on the 
forecasts given in this paper; in terms of constant 197k dollar prices, the 
gain would be equivalent to $U.2 billion. Since the largest beneficiary 
would be sugar, the bulk of the gain (over $5 billion in current terns) 
would accrue to the Latin American countries. Trade liberalization here 
is taken to mean the removal of tariffs and similar charges and the dis­
mantling of "non-tariff barriers" such as quantitative restrictions, 
internal taxes and aids to competing domestic production.
Irfhat Can Developing Countries Do
50. This question has not been sufficiently debated in UNCTAD and seme 
other fora. This is as well because less talk (and even lesser studies) 
and more action is badly neededo Self-help and coordinated national pol­
icies perhaps offer far reaching opportunities for most 1 / of the develop­
ing countries. Diversification into new products offering greater oppor­
tunities, improving efficiency in production and marketing and research 
(production as well as processing) are the backbone of any expanding system. 
The issues involved are known at the national and international level. In
1 / The problems of small, poor countries are more complex and are 
receiving extra attention from donor countries and international 
financial institutions.
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Table 16s EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE TRADE OPTIONS ON PROJECTED EXPORT EARNINGS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
FROM S E LE C T E D  PR IM A R Y  CO M M O D IT IES , 1 9 6 7 / 6 9  AVERAG E TO 1 98 0
A B
A v e r a g e  V a lu e  
1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 9
R a t e  o f  
C h a n g e
A v e r a g e  V a lu e  
1 9 7 2 -1 9 7 4
A v e r a g e  A n n u a l C h a n g e  
1 9 7 2 / 7 4 - 1 9 8 0  
V a lu e  V o lu m e  P r i c e
V a lu e  
i n  1 9 8 0
F o r e c a s t  
I n c r e a s e  I n  
E a r n in g s  
1 9 7 2 / 7 4 - 1 9 8 0
E f f e c t s
o f
L i b e r a
i z a t i o t
( m i l l i o n  US ( p e r c e n t ( m i l l i o n  US ( --------p e r c e n t — -------- ) ( ----------m i l l i o n  US d o l l a r s -------------
d o l l a r s ) p e r  y e a r ) d o l l a r s )
B e e f 353 2 5 .9 1 ,1 1 0 1 4 .0 3 . 6 1 0 .1 2 ,7 8 3 1 ,6 7 3 701
F is h m e a l 225 - 1 . 7 206 2 6 . 0 2 0 .0 5 . 0 1 ,0 3 7 831 0^
B a n a n a s 474 6 .0 635 8 . 6 2 . 6 5 . 8 1 ,1 2 9 4 94 384
C o c o a 648 1 2 .7 1 ,1 8 0 7 . 5 2 .4 5 . 0 1 ,9 6 0 780 21
C o f f e e 2 ,3 2 4 1 0 .4 3 ,8 0 2 9 .7 1 . 9 7 .7 7 ,2 8 7 3 ,4 8 5 504
T e a 5 23 4 . 1 639 6 .2 2 . 9 3 . 2 973 334 1
S u g a r 1 ,4 9 2 2 2 .7 4 ,1 5 1 8 .2 1 .5 6 . 6 7 ,2 1 1 3 ,0 6 0 3 ,9 4 0
C o t t o n 1 ,2 9 3 1 4 .1 2 ,5 0 4 7 .2 1 . 5 5 . 6 4 ,0 7 0 1 ,5 6 6 647
R u b b e r 955 1 2 .8 1 ,7 4 3 1 2 .8 4 . 5 8 . 0 4 ,0 6 4 2 ,3 2 1 0
L o g s 6 43 2 5 .9 2 ,0 1 9 1 3 .3 3 . 3 9 . 7 4 ,8 4 4 2 ,8 2 5 1 ,7 0 3  b
S u b - T o t a l 8 .9 3 0 1 5 .0 1 7 ,9 8 9 1 0 .1 2 .7 7 .2 3 5 ,3 5 8 1 7 ,3 6 9 7 ,9 0 1
P h o s p h a t e  R o c k 2 20 2 2 .5 607 1 8 .4 6 .0 1 1 .7 1 ,9 8 4 1 ,3 7 7 0
C o p p e r 2 ,2 8 1 1 2 .9 4 ,1 9 4 1 4 .2 5 . 9 7 . 8 1 0 ,6 1 5 6 ,4 2 1 0
B a u x i t e 183 7 .9 267 2 6 .5 7 .4 1 7 .8 1 ,3 8 5 1 ,1 1 8 0
T i n 558 1 1 .6 968 5 . 2 0 . 2 5 . 0 1 ,3 8 0 4 12 0
L e a d 1 13 1 2 .4 203 7 .4 0 . 5 6 . 9 335 132 0
Z in c 136 2 9 . 3 489 9 . 4 4 . 7 4 .5 917 428 0
S i l v e r 129 1 1 .4 221 1 6 .1 3 .1 1 2 .6 630 4 09 0
M a n g a n e se  O re 98 6 . 6 135 1 1 .3 3 .1 8 . 0 2 85 150 0
I r o n  O re 811 1 3 .0 1 ,4 9 7 1 9 .2 5 .5 1 3 .0 5 ,1 2 2 3 ,6 2 5 0
S u b - T o t a l 4 ,5 2 9 1 3 .6 8 .5 8 1 1 4 .9 5 . 0 9 . 4 2 2 ,6 5 3 1 4 ,0 7 2 0
T o t a l  o f  a b o v e  19 1 3 ,4 5 9 1 4 .6 2 6 .5 7 0 1 1 .8 3 .5 8 . 0 5 8 ,0 1 1 3 1 .4 4 1 7 ,9 0 1
O t h e r  P r im a r y  P r o d i. r t - s 1 0 ,6 0 7 1 3 .3 1 9 ,8 1 4 n . a . n . a . n . a . n . a .
r c /
P e t r o le u m  — . . . .
H ig h 1 3 ,5 0 7 4 1 .7 7 7 ,1 9 0 1 9 .5 2 . 6 1 6 .4
2 6 8 ,2 3 5 1 9 1 ,0 4 5
Low 1 3 ,5 0 7 4 1 .7 7 7 ,1 9 0 1 8 .8 5 . 2 1 2 .9 2 5 7 ,8 9 0 1 8 0 ,7 0 0
A l l  P r im a r y
C o m m o d it ie s  d / 3 7 ,5 7 3 2 6 .9 1 2 3 ,5 7 4 n . a . n . a . n . a . n . a .
__ . - . . . ___
I n c r e a s e  I n  1 9 8 0  e x p o r t s  o v e r  f o r e c a s t  v a lu e s  i n  " A " ,  
b / \  TjFrom e f f e c t s  on  p r o c e s s e d  t im b e r  e x p o r t s  o f  d e v e l o p in g  c o u n t r i e s  ( n e t  o f  p r o b a b l e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  e x p o r t s  o f  lo g s )  . 
ç /  H ig h  I n d i c a t e s  p r i c e  g r o w th  h ig h ,  v o lu m e  g r o w th  lo w ;  lo w  I n d i c a t e s  t h e  r e v e r s e .
§ J  C o v e r a g e :  UNCTAD d e f i n i t i o n  o f  p r im a r y  c o m m o d it ie s  -  i . e . ,  S IT C  0 t o  4 p l u s  6 8 .
S o u r c e :  C o m m o d it ie s  &  E x p o r t  P r o j e c t i o n s  D i v i s i o n ,
E c a n a n io  A n a l y s i s  &  P r o j e c t i o n s  D e p a r tm e n t  
D e v e lo p m e n t  P o l i c y  S t a f f
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agriculture, the impediments to growth have been analyzed in the Sector 
Surveys of the World B*nk and field work of the FAO. Nonetheless, the 
immense potential of Latin America remains unexploited. Intensive 
follow up has not materialized. It is in a way pitiful to see 
Californian pears and Louisiana rice in the shops of Rio when South 
America has all the elements of comparative advantage in vastly expanding 
and diversifying agricultural output for import substitution and gaining 
a greater share of the export markets. This is particularly so for food 
products.
$lo Two avenues which need attention and which offer considerable
scope for expanding the export earnings in short-run as well as the long- 
run are producer actions to raise prices for some products and shifting 
of several processing industries upstream to the producing regions.
Producer Action
i>2. There are possibilities of OPEC-type action to raise the prices
of several products (particularly certain metals and minerals) in the 
short-run, but in the long-run such cartels would be difficult to sus­
tain. Some of the necessary conditions for a cartel to work are that
(a) the commodity must be essential, (b) it must not have close substi­
tutes, (c) it must be possible to regulate production, and (d) countries 
involved must have the financial resources to hold back their exports, i f  
necessary. In addition, the demand should be price-inelastic at least 
in the short-run, the producers alliance should control a sizeable part 
of the world resources and members should have an identity of broad 
interests.
?3. But, i f  certain price discipline is imposed on the producers
alliance, that is , prices are pushed to unduly high levels and consumers 
are given assurances of supplies, it  is possible to raise prices of 
several products. The key issue here is how to bring countries around 
the countries involved to an agreeable scale of production cuts if  and 
when necessary. Some countries may be unwilling to sacrifice a planned 
expansion in their output or accept a slightly reduced share of the 
incremental demand in the world markets. The lack of producer action 
in bananas is amazing and can perhaps be used as a case in point.
51i. In bananas, no region in the world can presently compete with 
Latin America even if  ex-farm prices are doubled. Moreover, a doubling 
of the farm-gate price would lead to only a marginal increase in the 
retail price of bananas. The price-elasticity of demand is less than 
unity so that a given reduction in volume' of exports leads to a greater 
increase in total revenues. Bananas are also the cheapest fruit (and 
one of the cheapest edible goods that can be bought in the richer coun­
tries) so that a two cents per pound price increase, for example, will not 
lead to consumer resistance. Nonetheless, the few producing countries of 
Latin America are unable to agree on a plan of controlling and sharing the 
market for collective mutual benefit. Diis is , of course, only one 
commodity case in point.
55. If a scheme of supply management in some products is evolved, 
the lessons learnt from the petroleum experience need to be kept in view. 
The vast benefits derived from the petroleum price increase were not 
shared (with minor exceptions) with the rest of the developing countries. 
(In fact, it has led to extreme hardship for several of them.) Unless, 
a mechanism for sharing the benefits of price increases with other poor 
countries is evolved, a community of interest will not emerge and the 
problem of a growing gap between the rich and the poor will remain with 
us. It may even increase.
Upstream Industries
56. There are certain products in which the developing producing coun­
tries enjoy a comparative advantage in processing their own raw material 
nearer the centers of production, rather than exporting it unprocessed.
The necessary condition, of course, is that the processing activity should 
require relatively intensively the factors of production which are rela­
tively abundant in the developing countiy producing the relevant primary 
commodity. In some industries which are highly weight-saving (for example 
wood processing), there may also be great gains in terms of reduced trans­
portation cost further improving the comparative advantage enjoyed by the 
country. The benefits that would flow to the country include:
(i) higher export earnings per unit of raw material;
(ii) an initial step towards general industrialization of the 
country or the region; and
(iii)  employment, i f  there is unemployment or under-employment.
57« Since timber happens to be a product which faces brighter market 
prospects as compared to most other commodities, and since it  meets the 
conditions specified above, expansion of wood processing and associated 
manufacturing industries in certain Latin American countries offers 
unique opportunities.
-  3k -
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1. Critical assumptions governing the supply-demand balance, stock
position and related issues which have been brought to bear in forecast­
ing the prices presented in Chapter IV are summarized below.l/
Coffee
2. Coffee prices are expected to remain relatively strong throughout
the seventies, notwithstanding the suspension of economic provisions of 
the International Coffee Agreement. Favorable price prospects are the 
result of a combination of several factors including producer's reaction 
to the development of large surpluses and low prices in the mid-fifties 
to late sixties and production controls instituted under the aegis of the 
International Coffee Agreement of 1968.
3. The surplus and the deficit phases of the coffee cycle show that
long periods of heavy surpluses, in which disinvestment takes place, are 
followed by shorter periods of shortages and high prices when over­
investment occurs. However, the latter phase of the cycle seem3 to have 
been modified by the restraint on investment imposed under the Inter­
national Coffee Agreement and by greater co-ordination of national poli­
cies among the producing countries. It is expected that the coffee pro­
ducing countries will continue to follow a cautious policy concerning 
investment in coffee so that heavy surpluses during the eighties would 
not occur.
U. The tightening balance between world supply and demand is largely
due to developments in Brazil. For several years since 1969, Brazilian 
output has fallen short of current demand. Furthermore, the capacity to 
produce was also running below the most conservative demand estimates. 
Since 1970, Brazil has planted a large nunber of coffee trees to stem the 
declining tide of its production. A stabilization of production at a 
level arcund 27 million bags in 1980 can be expected, leaving about 17 
million bags available for exports and 10 million for domestic consump­
tion. As no substantial new plantings after 197U are envisaged, in­
creasing domestic consumption would leave no room for an increase in 
exports after 1980. In view of the wide awareness of the dangers of 
over-supply, the exportable production elsewhere in the world is expect­
ed to grow at a rate of not over 3 percent per annum in the beginning of 
the eighties. The combined effect of sluggish growth elsewhere and vir­
tually zero growth in Brazilian exports would be that export availabili­
ties would tend to match world import demand reckoned to rise at 2 per­
cent per annum.
5. A more stable market is not likely to develop before the late
1970's, when the downward trend in Brazilian exportable production would
SPECIAL FACTORS AFFECTING MAJOR COMMODITIES
1/ Not all products are covered here. Further details are given in 
IBRD Commodity Papers Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9.
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have been stemmed. However, since stocks would be below present levels 
by then, even if  production grows more rapidly after 1980 than in the 
present decade, prices would remain firm. The forecasted trend price 
of 6£ US cents per pound in 197k constant prices from 1979 onwards, is 
conservative in view of the projected supply-demand balance and contains 
an element of hedging against the possibility of increased supply in res­
ponse to current and anticipated high prices during the next few years.
Sugar
6o The world price which for a number of years had been abnormally
low, had recovered when in the late sixties equilibrium between demand 
and supply on the market was restored. In the early seventies shortage, 
due to greatly reduced output in Cuba and the USSR, led to drawing down 
of stocks. Ag a result prices started to climb steeply late in 1971 and 
have reached an all time high of 32 US cents per pound in August of 197ko
7. Both structural and temporary factors are behind the sluggish 
increase in output despite the increasing sugar prices of the past three 
years. Scarcity of land, lack of funds and increasing costs of estab­
lishing new plants have hampered the expansion of the sugar industry.
Over the longer run, the supply of sugar is expected to be affected by 
the impact of the higher energy prices on transportation and production 
costs.
8. In the period of 197k-1980, production expansion is projected to 
take place in several countries. Brazil has plans for continued growth 
and several of the smaller cane producers are hoping to take steps toward 
achieving self-sufficiency. However, the major obstacles to recovery of 
the supply situation in the following year or two are first, the severe 
drought conditions in Northeast Brazil and some Latin American countries 
which occurred in 1973. Secondly, toward the end of 1973 the EEC 
revised its estimated sugar exports to about half of the original figure 
of approximately 800 thousand tons and introduced an export levy on sugar0
9. Total world sugar consumption and production are forecast to
expand by almost 20 percent between 197k and 1980. S till, taking into 
account the cost increasing factors, the real price is expected to remain 
high, compared to the pre-1971 level. The average world sugar price for 
1969-71 in terms of 197k prices were kd US cents per pound, while 1980 
prices are projected to be 8.£ US cents per pound. This projection is 
based on the following assumptions: (i) that the International Sugar
Agreement will not be renewed} and (li) that Cuba’ s sugar output will con­
tinue to be exported mainly to the centrally planned coun­
tries and will not exceed substantially the average level of output in the 
past decade.
Cotton
10. Cotton prices reached near record levels in January 197k, having 
risen sharply over the previous year. A major downward adjustment in
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prices is expected over the next three years as production is likely to 
exceed consumption requirements. It is unlikely that cotton prices will
be driven to the levels obtained in the late 1960's however, in view of a 
sizeable increase in production input costs. Assuming that the necessary 
correction in the supply/demand balance will be completed by 1977, cotton 
prices are likely to stabilize in 1977-1980 at around 52 IB cents per 
pound in terms of 197h prices. The projection assumes that productivity 
increases in cotton growing will continue to offset increases in the real 
costs of inputs. Moreover, the high quantity of synthetic fibers antici­
pated from increasingly efficient new plants is expected to maintain 
severe competitive pressure in the fiber’s market, tending to force cotton 
prices towards their long-run cost levels.
11. World cotton consumption is forecast to continue increasing at 
around the long-term rate of 1.7 percent per year to 1980 and 1985°
Demand will be sustained in the near-term by less intense competition from 
the synthetic fibers and in the late 1970’ s and 1980's by rising income 
and increasing population. The growth in mill consumption of cotton in 
the developing countries is projected at 2.9 percent per year compared to
1.5 percent in the centrally planned countries and less than one half a 
percent in the developed countries. This implies a continued shift in 
cotton manufacturing from the developed to the developing countries.
12. In order to match the projected level of consumption in 1980 and 
provide for "normal” cany over stocks equivalent to five months consump­
tion, cotton production would have to increase at an annual rate of 1.3 
percent between 1973/7b and I980/ 8I . In the current (197U/75) season, 
major expansions in cotton planting are expected in those countries with 
facilities for forward trading at the producer level, such as in the U.S., 
Mexico and the Central American countries. The anticipated level of pro­
duction in I97I4/75 would raise carry over s t o c k s  well above five months off­
take, necessitating a subsequent decline and then slower growth in produc­
tion in order to balance supply and demand by 1980.
13. The long-term growth rate for cotton production has been greater 
in the developing countries than in the other areas. This situation is 
likely to continue in the late 1970's, as they better utilize present 
know-how to raise productivity and develop new cotton growing areas. In 
the short-run, however, the need for food crops and the insulation of many 
producers from international price levels limits the responsiveness of 
some growers to changes in market prices for cotton. Accordingly, the 
supply elasticity of cotton production with respect to price is estimated 
at 0.7 in the developing countries, compared to 1.7 in the United States.
Bananas
lUo Bananas have all the features of a surplus commodity. Supplies
have been growing rapidly in recent years due to increase in productivity 
and planting areas. Demand grows slowly in the major markets partly as 
a result of low income elasticity at the level of consumption reached in
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the developed countries and to a lesser extent, as a result of various 
trade barriers and internal taxes which restrict access to markets. 
Reflecting this situation, banana prices have fallen in real terms over 
the last few years and current prices have hardly followed the rising 
trend in commodity prices recorded since 1972.
15. The greatest amount of canpetition among producing and exporting 
countries takes place in non-preferential markets. The difficulties 
which arise from excess supplies from competing exporters in such markets 
are magnified by the fact that only small quantities can be redirected to 
preferential markets such as those of France, Italy and the U.K. Supplies 
in other markets such as the United States are controlled by international 
companies whose cost structures allow them to withstand much sharper price 
declines than independent producers.
16. The world import demand is projected at 7.6 million tons in 1980 
under the assumption that the growth of consumption and imports in the 
major markets will continue at the same rate as in recent years. World 
export availabilities are projected at 11 million tons in 1980 under the 
assumption that the rate of growth experienced in recent years will 
remain unchanged until 1980, but with a modest 10 percent allowance on 
the downward side to account for any reduction in supplies as a result 
of possible concerted action by banana exporting countries.
17. The prices necessary to clear the market in 1980 are forecast at
13.5 US cents per kilogram in 197U constant terms. This forecast is 
based on the price elasticity of demand at -0.8 and a supply elasticity 
of 0.5o The projected current prices under assumed inflation rates are 
21.Ij. US cents per kilogram. This figure incorporates a supplement of 3 
percent per year for assumed higher freight rates.
18. The recent signing of the Panama Agreement has introduced a new 
element in the markBt situation. Seven major producers (Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) have decided to 
form a Union of Banana Exporting Countries and have agreed to tax exports 
of bananas. Only three countries have implemented the export tax mea­
sures, however, and the prospect for a successful implementation of the 
Agreement depends on the extent to which production cutbacks can be 
organized. It appears that the problems of reallocation of land and 
labor in the producing countries may be difficult to overcome rapidly to 
bring about a balance between supply and demand.
Copper
19. The world copper market is likely to be in a state of surplus 
around 1980, but the surplus may be largely eradicated by 1985» Based 
on an analysis of likely developments of demand and supply and the price- 
cost relationships assumed, the price of refined copper in London is 
projected to be 135 US cents per pound in current dollar terns in 1980
and 200 US cents per pound in 1985. These prices are equivalent to 85 and 
9U cents per pound in 197U constant dollar terms respectively.
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20. World consumption of refined copper is projected to increase from
6.2 million tons in 1972, to 8.8 million tons in 1980 or at k»5 percent 
per annum. The long-term growth trend of consumption over the period 
1950-1973 was k.2 percent per annum. World consumption in 1985, based 
on this trend, would be 10.8 million tons. The demand assumptions under­
lying the long-term price forecasts are especially sensitive to the long­
term economic growth in the major consuming countries. While there are 
a number of additional factors which may influence the demand trend, such 
as competition from substitutes (aluminum and plastics in particular) and 
net exports to the centrally planned economies, these are of secondary 
importance.
21. Overall, however, the uncertainties on the supply side are prob­
ably greater than those on the demand side since they relate not only to 
possible physical constraints (in terms of càpital and labor availabili­
ties) but also to investment and production strategies as they might be 
affected by economic and political considerations. Special elements of 
uncertainty include: (i) the future growth of production in Chile,
Panama, Peru and Mexico} (ii) the possibility of serious labor strikes in 
the U.S. copper industry in 197k and 1977 when contracts come up for 
renewal.
22. It is assumed that the average cost of copper would rise by about
8 percent in real terms during the 1970 decade and that under the prob­
able market conditions of weakness in 1980 the price-cost ratio would be 
about 1.5 rather than historical ratio of 1.75o As for the price of 
copper in 1985, it is assumed, on the one hand, that the cost in real 
terms would not rise in the 1980-85.period, and, on the other hand, that 
the copper market in 1985 would be in near balance warranting the appli­
cation of rates fairly near the historical average price-cost ratio.
23» It is also assumed that an effective OPEC-type arrangement will
not be made or that, if such a cartel is formed, it would be effective 
only to prevent substantial falls in prices in the face of possible sur­
plus situation.
Beef
2k. Demand for beef has greatly increased in recent years despite the 
fact that the prices of its principal substitutes, pork and poultry, have 
declined in relation to the price of beef. The income elasticity of 
demand for beef in most countries is generally higher than for its close 
substitutes and this, coupled with continued growth in real per capita 
income around the world contributes to the high level of demand. It is 
also hypothesized that income growth has brought many low income people 
to an income range where the income elasticity of demand for beef is much 
higher and the cross-price elasticity with non-meat substitutes is lower 
than at lower income levels.
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25. Future demand is projected on the basis of projected real income 
growth rates and assuming constant relative prices of beef, pork and poul­
try. The validity of this simple assumption has not been tested. It 
implies prices of beef and that future technological changes affecting pro­
duction of these meats will be more or less uniform. Under this assump­
tion, the demand for beef can be analyzed from income elasticity alone,
26. Supply projections are made by extrapolating production trends
including cyclical patterns and modified to allow for certain cases where 
countries had definite plans to expand production at a faster rate than in 
the past and where such plans were believed feasible.
27o Demand and supply projections were made on a country by country
basis for 18 major exporting and importing countries which account for
about 90 percent of all trade in fresh, chilled and frozen beef. In the 
case of minor exporting countries, it was assumed that collectively they 
will continue to export about 100 thousand tons annually through 1980.
Using an import price elasticity of demand of -1.25 the price changes 
necessary for market clearance were calculated from the difference between 
global import requirements and export availabilities. The 1980 price in 
real terms is projected to be 11 percent higher than the 1973 price.
Bauxite
28. The price of bauxite in the leading world markets (US and Canada) 
is expected to increase in real terms during the 197U-85 period. The
US import reference price based on imports from Jamaica is projected to 
increase from lli.3 US dollars per metric ton in terms of 197U prices to 
30 US dollars per metric ton in 1980 and 1985.
29. World demand for bauxite is forecast to increase from 59 million 
tons in 1972 to 120 million tons in 1980, or by about 9 percent per annum. 
This forecast is derived from projection of demand growth for primary 
aluminum. The effects of the higher cost of energy outside North America 
are more severe for aluminum than for competing metals. Therefore it  
appears doubtful that the substitution by aluminum for other materials will 
continue at the same rate as in the past. However, its competitive posi­
tion will remain reasonably strong.
30. Proven world bauxite reserves have increased rapidly in the last 
decade; as of early 1972 they amounted to more than 200 times the 1972 
production rate0 Prospects for new discoveries are considered encour­
aging by the industry. Comparison of future world bauxite demand and 
production indicates that ample supply is available to cover the require­
ments of the aluminum industry, other industry (refractories and abra­
sives) as well as demand from the centrally planned economies.
31. The price of bauxite is established by the major companies for 
their internal accounting, with emphasis on tax advantage rather than on
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demand and supply considerations. It is, therefore, an artificial price.
In contracts between governments of countries where bauxite is produced 
and the mining companies, tax provisions and other financial considerations 
dominate the determination of bauxite prices, bearing little relation to 
production costs or the rent that should accrue to a non-renewable resource. 
However, bauxite prices do take account of alumina content and the nature of 
impurities, the quantities and the payment terms of purchase arrangements.
Fishmeal
32. The share of Peru in world production of fishmeal and solubles 
(including whale products) was 35-Uo percent in the late sixties; this 
country's share in world exports was well over 50 percent in most years.
The failure of the Peruvian catch in 1973 raised the price of fishmeal 
sharply. The rate of recovery of the Peruvian anchoveta stock and the 
maintenance of fish catches in other countries are, therefore, crucial for 
price projections. The fishmeal price also depends on the availability 
of substitutes such as soybean, groundnut and cottonseed meals, and on the 
permanence of the changed fishmeal demand structure resulting from adjust- 
m ent of animal feeding practices to the fishmeal scarcity.
33. It is not likely that other countries can make up for the Peruvian 
deficit. Despite increased fishing effort, catches have only increased 
by 2 percent per annum in developed countries and a decline due to over­
fishing is expected. Among centrally planned countries the rate of 
increase in catch was about 10 percent per annum, but volume is very small. 
Most experts believe that conventional fish resources have already reached 
or surpassed their maximum sustainable yield, with the result that catches 
can best be expected to remain constant.
3k* Projections of the availability of vegetable protein substitutes
indicate that the demand for protein meals is likely to grow faster than 
supply as the richer developing countries begin to consume increasing 
amounts of their own production and as capacity for expansion, particularly 
in industrial countries, faces further limitations.
35. The protein feed meal market is expected to expand as a result of
increasing demand for livestock products. Fishmeal, remaining on constant 
supply, will cover a declining share of total feed requirements. As a 
result, it is quite possible that the use of fishmeal wi l l  become more 
specialized, notably as a source of feed for breeding animals where the 
provision of high grade protein is vital. This implies that the ratio of 
fishmeal price to soymeal price may rise above historical levels, l.lj. for 
the period of mid-1960fs to 1971, livestock enterprises being prepared to 
pay more to ensure necessary supplies. A figure of 1.8 is considered a 
reasonable estimate of the upper limit of the ratio in the long run.
Iron Ore
36. Projections concerning iron ore are necessarily linked to projec­
tions of steel production in major industrial areas. Steel consumption
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is projected on the basis of estimated income élasticités of demand which 
range from 0.6-0.7 in the United States and the United Kingdom to 0.98 in 
the EEC, l.k7 in Japan and from 1.5 to 3»G in developing countries. Donand 
for iron ore increases pari passu with demand for steel.
37. The current steel situation is one of tight supply both in the 
United States and in Japan and also, though perhaps to a lesser degree, in 
Western Europe. Some private forecasts foresee a continuation of the pres­
ent rate of growth of production in 197k, even in the event of a slowdown in 
economic growth this year. For 1975» it  appears reasonable to foresee a 
continuation of world steel production at 197k levels, which have been esti­
mated at 700-720 million metric tons by the International Iron and Steel 
Institute. Steel production in the developed countries would grow at 3 
percent per annum for the years 1975-80. This would yield a 1980 steel 
production of 570 million tons in developed countries. The projections 
for centrally planned economies and developing countries in 1980 were 265 
million tons and 55 million tons, respectively. Total world steel output 
in 1980 would thus amount to 890 million tons. In correspondence with 
these forecasts the world iron ore production in 1980 is forecast at 1,035 
million tons.
380 The impact of these developments is that iron ore prices would rise 
in real terms in 197k and fall back in 1975. Recent published reports 
concerning short-term iron ore delivery contracts, which cover a large pro­
portion of world trade corroborate this. Reflecting the recent steel boom, 
terms of delivery contracts concluded by major steel importing companies 
improved in 1973 and, since most contracts are reported to have been con­
cluded for 197k before the energy crisis set in, there is reason to expect 
a further increase in iron ore prices this year. In contrast, delivery 
contracts for 1975 are likely to reflect both the expected stagnation in 
steel production and the fact that by the end of that year iron ore stocks 
will be replenished. As far as long-term delivery contracts are concerned, 
those concluded during the last two years provide for price increases to 
reflect the inflation in mining costs and older contracts have generally 
been renegotiated to include such clauses. This is notably the case in 
contracts with Japan. Therefore, the iron ore prices are expected to 
increase gradually between 1975 and 198O.
39. In view of the structure of the iron ore market, price elastici­
ties of demand for iron ore have not been identified. It is assumed, 
however, that these elasticities are close to zero for aggregate demand 
on the "free" market, at least within a wide range of variation of steel 
prices.
Petroleum
kO. Realized f.o .b . prices of crude oil exported py the eleven member 
countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
which accounted for 95 percent of crude oil exports from developing coun­
tries, have been rising sharply in the last three years and are expected
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to remain high through 1980» The overall level of prices for Arabian 
Light crude oil is forecast at $9.60 per barrel during 197U and to remain 
at that level in 1975 in current prices, i .e . ,  eroding that year with 
inflation to about $8.65 in 197U dollars and this constant price is assum­
ed through 1980. This current price is composed of $7.00 for
royalties and taxation, $0.11 production costs, $0.35 producers1 margin 
and $2, 114. government participation benefit,» The last element could range 
from about $0.90 to $2.25 per barrel, assuming that government crude oil 
prices range from 73 percent to 93 percent of posted price. Currently 
these are at the top end of this range, but they may not necessarily 
remain there.
Í4I .  In view of the higher f.o .b . export prices commanded by crude 
oils elsewhere which contain higher valued components or less sulphur or 
which are nearer to main import markets, the average f.o .b . price for 
crude oil exported from all major oil exporting countries appears to be 
about 60 cents higher than Arabian Light.
Í4.2. The outlook for petroleum prices is linked to energy demand and
supplyj demand depends on economic growth and prices. Energy imports 
into industrially advanced countries consist largely of petroleum of 
which about 90 percent originates from OPEC members. The total amount 
of oil which may be required from OPEC and from individual countries in 
particular, would indicate the strength of their bargaining position 
when compared to their production capacity. The sensitivity of the pro­
jection is considerable, as capacity is compared to residual demand; the 
magnitude of recent price increases and their impact on demand for oil 
and the supply of other energy sources add to the degree of uncertainty 
regarding future market developments. World demand for oil from OPEC 
nations might be in the range of 1. 8- 2.1 billion tons by I980 under the 
assumption of an economic growth rate at 3.it-U.7 percent per year in OECD 
countries for the years 1973-80.
U3. Within the OPEC membership Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Iran and Iraq
are seen likely to make the key decisions on levels of output during the 
next few years, sufficient to have ultimate determining power over oil 
prices. Other countries, particularly Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia and 
Venezuela are thought to have a more limited production potential, while 
Kuwait and Libya have already curtailed output on grounds of conservation 
and besides have no evident need for incremental output to meet financial 
requirements. The amount of revenues which Iran and Iraq need to earn 
from oil to help finance development and other programs looks considerable 
on present evidence, though this needs continuous review; they are cur­
rently seeking to develop oil production potential to its presently fore­
seen limit. Saudi Arabia -  and to a lesser extent Abu Dhabi -  have flex­
ibility to supply the worlds incremental demand for oil. However, they 
will be experiencing an increasing domestic resource surplus which will 
remove any incentive to increase oil output to meet financial requirements. 
They have the choice between financial assets and oil in the ground for 
later use. Those OPEC members with large domestic resource surpluses 
will earn unprecedented sums, giving freedom to restrict oil production, 
even though they may thereby forego current revenue; Kuwait and Libya 
have already done so.
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UI4. Thus, Saudi Arabia would become the supplier of the world's incre­
mental oil requirements. This country has set forth two conditions on 
which it  would need to be satisfied before agreeing to meet the long-term 
needs of developed countries: (i) such countries must effectively assist
Saudi Arabia in industrializing itself in order (a) to create an alter­
native source of income to oil whose depletion would be accelerated by 
increasing production, and (b) to absorb the excess income resulting from 
production at such a level; and (ii)  a suitable political atmosphere must 
be present.
1*5» The choice of policy has evident implications for future prices. 
With higher energy costs, there will be serious attempts in major indus­
trialized countries to improve efficiency in the use of energy and to 
encourage the development of domestic sources of energy and thereby les­
sen the ever-growing cost of oil imports. Some sources can be brought in 
with existing proven technology, while others may require further develop­
ment of technology. Thus, a major shift could take place in the patterns 
of energy use. However, the amount of capital expenditure needed is huge 
and for some energy sources the problem of finding acceptable sites, dis­
posing of waste and operating reliably and safely are large. It is im­
possible to be precise on the timing of such a shift or on the effect on 
internationally traded oil, but on the present evidence the consequences 
are unlikely to be significantly felt before the mid-1980's .
I4.6. During the next several years, downward pressure on international 
market prices could continue i f  (a) world energy demand growth continues 
to be constrained, (b) efforts to develop domestic resources in oil- 
importing countries meet with success, and (c) new productive capacity is 
installed by OPEC members at officially announced rates. On these assump­
tions spare capacity would probably emerge. However, the large margins 
of uncertainty around these projections leave considerable scope for the 
possibility that prices and government unit revenues in oil exporting 
developing countries will not decline in current or even in real terms 
during the next several years. Although OPEC members may each have dif­
ferent objectives for the next 5-10 years and may therefore express dif­
fering views on OPEC pricing policy, they have experienced the benefits 
of operating as a group,vhich led to the present level of prices and 
revenues. There is no reason yet to suppose that differences of view 
within OPEC could not be resolved.
i
